Cezary Cieslinski and his team organize a workshop on formal theories of truth in Warsaw, to take place 28-30 September 2017. The invites include Dora Achourioti, Ali Enayat, Kentaro Fujimoto, Volker Halbach, Graham Leigh, and Albert Visser. Submission deadline is May 15. More details here.

# M-Phi

A blog dedicated to mathematical philosophy.

## Saturday, 8 April 2017

## Sunday, 19 March 2017

### Aggregating incoherent credences: the case of geometric pooling

In the last few posts (here and here), I've been exploring how we should extend the probabilistic aggregation method of linear pooling so that it applies to groups that contain incoherent individuals (which is, let's be honest, just about all groups). And our answer has been this: there are three methods -- linear-pool-then-fix, fix-then-linear-pool, and fix-and-linear-pool-together -- and they agree with one another just in case you fix incoherent credences by taking the nearest coherent credences as measured by squared Euclidean distance. In this post, I ask how we should extend the probabilistic aggregation method of geometric pooling.

As before, I'll just consider the simplest case, where we have two individuals, Adila and Benoit, and they have credence functions -- $c_A$ and $c_B$, respectively -- that are defined for a proposition $X$ and its negation $\overline{X}$. Suppose $c_A$ and $c_B$ are coherent. Then geometric pooling says:

Now, in the case of linear pooling, if $c_A$ or $c_B$ is incoherent, then it is most likely that any linear pool of them is also incoherent. However, in the case of geometric pooling, this is not the case. Linear pooling requires us to take a weighted arithmetic average of the credences we are aggregating. If those credences are coherent, so is their weighted arithmetic average. Thus, if you are considering only coherent credences, there is no need to normalize the weighted arithmetic average after taking it to ensure coherence. However, even if the credences we are aggregating are coherent, their weighted geometric averages are not. Thus, geometric pooling requires that we first take the weighted geometric average of the credences we are pooling and then normalize the result, to ensure that the result is coherent. But this trick works whether or not the original credences are coherent. Thus, we need do nothing more to geometric pooling in order to apply it to incoherent agents.

Nonetheless, questions still arise. What we have shown is that, if we first geometrically pool our two incoherent agents, then the result is in fact coherent and so we don't need to undertake the further step of fixing up the credences to make them coherent. But what if we first choose to fix up our two incoherent agents so that they are coherent, and then geometrically pool them? Does this give the same answer as if we just pooled the incoherent agents? And, similarly, what if we decide to fix and pool together?

Interestingly, the results are exactly the reverse of the results in the case of linear pooling. In that case, if we fix up incoherent credences by taking the coherent credences that minimize squared Euclidean distance, then all three methods agree, whereas if we fix them up by taking the coherent credences that minimize generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence, then sometimes all three methods disagree. In the case of geometric pooling, it is the opposite. Fixing up using generalized KL divergence makes all three methods agree -- that is, pool, fix-then-pool, and fix-and-pool-together all give the same result when we use GKL to measure distance. But fixing up using squared Euclidean distance leads to three separate methods that sometimes all disagree. That is, GKL is the natural distance measure to accompany geometric pooling, while SED is the natural measure to accompany linear pooling.

As before, I'll just consider the simplest case, where we have two individuals, Adila and Benoit, and they have credence functions -- $c_A$ and $c_B$, respectively -- that are defined for a proposition $X$ and its negation $\overline{X}$. Suppose $c_A$ and $c_B$ are coherent. Then geometric pooling says:

**Geometric pooling**The aggregation of $c_A$ and $c_B$ is $c$, where- $c(X) = \frac{c_A(X)^\alpha c_B(X)^{1-\alpha}}{c_A(X)^\alpha c_B(X)^{1-\alpha} + c_A(\overline{X})^\alpha c_B(\overline{X})^{1-\alpha}}$
- $c(\overline{X}) = \frac{c_A(\overline{X})^\alpha c_B(\overline{X})^{1-\alpha}}{c_A(X)^\alpha c_B(X)^{1-\alpha} + c_A(\overline{X})^\alpha c_B(\overline{X})^{1-\alpha}}$

Now, in the case of linear pooling, if $c_A$ or $c_B$ is incoherent, then it is most likely that any linear pool of them is also incoherent. However, in the case of geometric pooling, this is not the case. Linear pooling requires us to take a weighted arithmetic average of the credences we are aggregating. If those credences are coherent, so is their weighted arithmetic average. Thus, if you are considering only coherent credences, there is no need to normalize the weighted arithmetic average after taking it to ensure coherence. However, even if the credences we are aggregating are coherent, their weighted geometric averages are not. Thus, geometric pooling requires that we first take the weighted geometric average of the credences we are pooling and then normalize the result, to ensure that the result is coherent. But this trick works whether or not the original credences are coherent. Thus, we need do nothing more to geometric pooling in order to apply it to incoherent agents.

Nonetheless, questions still arise. What we have shown is that, if we first geometrically pool our two incoherent agents, then the result is in fact coherent and so we don't need to undertake the further step of fixing up the credences to make them coherent. But what if we first choose to fix up our two incoherent agents so that they are coherent, and then geometrically pool them? Does this give the same answer as if we just pooled the incoherent agents? And, similarly, what if we decide to fix and pool together?

Interestingly, the results are exactly the reverse of the results in the case of linear pooling. In that case, if we fix up incoherent credences by taking the coherent credences that minimize squared Euclidean distance, then all three methods agree, whereas if we fix them up by taking the coherent credences that minimize generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence, then sometimes all three methods disagree. In the case of geometric pooling, it is the opposite. Fixing up using generalized KL divergence makes all three methods agree -- that is, pool, fix-then-pool, and fix-and-pool-together all give the same result when we use GKL to measure distance. But fixing up using squared Euclidean distance leads to three separate methods that sometimes all disagree. That is, GKL is the natural distance measure to accompany geometric pooling, while SED is the natural measure to accompany linear pooling.

## Friday, 17 March 2017

### A little more on aggregating incoherent credences

Last week, I wrote about a problem that arises if you wish to aggregate the credal judgments of a group of agents when one or more of those agents has incoherent credences. I focussed on the case of two agents, Adila and Benoit, who have credence functions $c_A$ and $c_B$, respectively. $c_A$ and $c_B$ are defined over just two propositions, $X$ and its negation $\overline{X}$.

I noted that there are two natural ways to aggregate $c_A$ and $c_B$ for someone who adheres to Probabilism, the principle that says that credences should be coherent. You might first fix up Adila's and Benoit's credences so that they are coherent, and then aggregate them using linear pooling -- let's call that

How do we fix up incoherent credences? Well, a natural idea is to find the coherent credences that are closest to them and adopt those in their place. This obviously requires a measure of distance between two credence functions. In last week's post, I considered two:

If we use $SED$ when we are fixing incoherent credences -- that is, if we fix an incoherent credence function $c$ by adopting the coherent credence function $c^*$ for which $SED(c^*, c)$ is minimal -- then fix-then-pool gives

If we use GKL when we are fixing incoherent credences -- that is, if we fix an incoherent credence function $c$ by adopting the coherent credence function $c^*$ for which $GKL(c^*, c)$ is minimal -- then fix-then-pool gives

Since last week's post, I've been reading this paper by Joel Predd, Daniel Osherson, Sanjeev Kulkarni, and Vincent Poor. They suggest that we pool and fix incoherent credences in one go using a method called the Coherent Aggregation Principle (CAP), formulated in this paper by Daniel Osherson and Moshe Vardi. In its original version, CAP says that we should aggregate Adila's and Benoit's credences by taking the coherent credence function $c$ such that the sum of the distance of $c$ from $c_A$ and the distance of $c$ from $c_B$ is minimized. That is,

As they note, if we take $SED$ to be our measure of distance, then this method generalizes the aggregation procedure on coherent credences that just takes straight averages of credences. That is, CAP entails unweighted linear pooling:

We can generalize this result a little by taking a weighted sum of the distances, rather than the straight sum.

If we take $SED$ to measure the distance between credence functions, then this method generalizes linear pooling. That is, Weighted CAP entails linear pooling:

What's more, when distance is measured by $SED$, Weighted CAP agrees with fix-then-pool and with pool-then-fix (providing the fixing is done using $SED$ as well). Thus, when we use $SED$, all of the methods for aggregating incoherent credences that we've considered agree. In particular, they all recommend the following credence in $X$: $$\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\alpha(c_A(X)-c_A(\overline{X})) + (1-\alpha)(c_B(X) - c_B(\overline{X}))}{2}$$

However, the story is not nearly so neat and tidy if we measure the distance between two credence functions using $GKL$. Here's the credence in $X$ recommended by fix-then-pool:$$\alpha \frac{c_A(X)}{c_A(X) + c_A(\overline{X})} + (1-\alpha)\frac{c_B(X)}{c_B(X) + c_B(\overline{X})}$$ Here's the credence in $X$ recommended by pool-then-fix: $$\frac{\alpha c_A(X) + (1-\alpha)c_B(X)}{\alpha (c_A(X) + c_A(\overline{X})) + (1-\alpha)(c_B(X) + c_B(\overline{X}))}$$ And here's the credence in $X$ recommended by Weighted CAP: $$\frac{c_A(X)^\alpha c_B(X)^{1-\alpha}}{c_A(X)^\alpha c_B(X)^{1-\alpha} + c_A(\overline{X})^\alpha c_B(\overline{X})^{1-\alpha}}$$ For many values of $\alpha$, $c_A(X)$, $c_A(\overline{X})$, $c_B(X)$, $c_B(\overline{X})$ these will give three distinct results.

I noted that there are two natural ways to aggregate $c_A$ and $c_B$ for someone who adheres to Probabilism, the principle that says that credences should be coherent. You might first fix up Adila's and Benoit's credences so that they are coherent, and then aggregate them using linear pooling -- let's call that

*fix-**then-pool*. Or you might aggregate Adila's and Benoit's credences using linear pooling, and then fix up the pooled credences so that they are coherent -- let's call that*pool-**then-fix*. And I noted that, for some natural ways of fixing up incoherent credences, fix-then-pool gives a different result from pool-then-fix. This, I claimed, creates a dilemma for the person doing the aggregating, since there seems to be no principled reason to favour either method.How do we fix up incoherent credences? Well, a natural idea is to find the coherent credences that are closest to them and adopt those in their place. This obviously requires a measure of distance between two credence functions. In last week's post, I considered two:

**Squared Euclidean Distance (SED)**For two credence functions $c$, $c'$ defined on a set of propositions $X_1$, $\ldots$, $X_n$,$$SED(c, c') = \sum^n_{i=1} (c(X_i) - c'(X_i))^2$$**Generalized Kullback-Leibler Divergence (GKL)**For two credence functions $c$, $c'$ defined on a set of propositions $X_1$, $\ldots$, $X_n$,$$GKL(c, c') = \sum^n_{i=1} c(X_i) \mathrm{log}\frac{c(X_i)}{c'(X_i)} - \sum^n_{i=1} c(X_i) + \sum^n_{i=1} c'(X_i)$$If we use $SED$ when we are fixing incoherent credences -- that is, if we fix an incoherent credence function $c$ by adopting the coherent credence function $c^*$ for which $SED(c^*, c)$ is minimal -- then fix-then-pool gives

*the same results*as pool-then-fix.If we use GKL when we are fixing incoherent credences -- that is, if we fix an incoherent credence function $c$ by adopting the coherent credence function $c^*$ for which $GKL(c^*, c)$ is minimal -- then fix-then-pool gives

*different results*from pool-then-fix.Since last week's post, I've been reading this paper by Joel Predd, Daniel Osherson, Sanjeev Kulkarni, and Vincent Poor. They suggest that we pool and fix incoherent credences in one go using a method called the Coherent Aggregation Principle (CAP), formulated in this paper by Daniel Osherson and Moshe Vardi. In its original version, CAP says that we should aggregate Adila's and Benoit's credences by taking the coherent credence function $c$ such that the sum of the distance of $c$ from $c_A$ and the distance of $c$ from $c_B$ is minimized. That is,

**CAP**Given a measure of distance $D$ between credence functions, we should pick that coherent credence function $c$ such that minimizes $D(c, c_A) + D(c, c_B)$.As they note, if we take $SED$ to be our measure of distance, then this method generalizes the aggregation procedure on coherent credences that just takes straight averages of credences. That is, CAP entails unweighted linear pooling:

**Unweighted Linear Pooling**If $c_A$ and $c_B$ are coherent, then the aggregation of $c_A$ and $c_B$ is $$\frac{1}{2} c_A + \frac{1}{2}c_B$$We can generalize this result a little by taking a weighted sum of the distances, rather than the straight sum.

**Weighted CAP**Given a measure of distance $D$ between credence functions, and given $0 \leq \alpha leq 1$, we should pick the coherent credence function $c$ that minimizes $\alpha D(c, c_A) + (1-\alpha)D(c, c_B)$.If we take $SED$ to measure the distance between credence functions, then this method generalizes linear pooling. That is, Weighted CAP entails linear pooling:

**Linear Pooling**If $c_A$ and $c_B$ are coherent, then the aggregation of $c_A$ and $c_B$ is $$\alpha c_A + (1-\alpha)c_B$$ for some $0 \leq \alpha \leq 1$.What's more, when distance is measured by $SED$, Weighted CAP agrees with fix-then-pool and with pool-then-fix (providing the fixing is done using $SED$ as well). Thus, when we use $SED$, all of the methods for aggregating incoherent credences that we've considered agree. In particular, they all recommend the following credence in $X$: $$\frac{1}{2} + \frac{\alpha(c_A(X)-c_A(\overline{X})) + (1-\alpha)(c_B(X) - c_B(\overline{X}))}{2}$$

However, the story is not nearly so neat and tidy if we measure the distance between two credence functions using $GKL$. Here's the credence in $X$ recommended by fix-then-pool:$$\alpha \frac{c_A(X)}{c_A(X) + c_A(\overline{X})} + (1-\alpha)\frac{c_B(X)}{c_B(X) + c_B(\overline{X})}$$ Here's the credence in $X$ recommended by pool-then-fix: $$\frac{\alpha c_A(X) + (1-\alpha)c_B(X)}{\alpha (c_A(X) + c_A(\overline{X})) + (1-\alpha)(c_B(X) + c_B(\overline{X}))}$$ And here's the credence in $X$ recommended by Weighted CAP: $$\frac{c_A(X)^\alpha c_B(X)^{1-\alpha}}{c_A(X)^\alpha c_B(X)^{1-\alpha} + c_A(\overline{X})^\alpha c_B(\overline{X})^{1-\alpha}}$$ For many values of $\alpha$, $c_A(X)$, $c_A(\overline{X})$, $c_B(X)$, $c_B(\overline{X})$ these will give three distinct results.

## Friday, 10 March 2017

### A dilemma for judgment aggregation

Let's suppose that Adila and Benoit are both experts, and suppose that we are interested in gleaning from their opinions about a certain proposition $X$ and its negation $\overline{X}$ a judgment of our own about $X$ and $\overline{X}$. Adila has credence function $c_A$, while Benoit has credence function $c_B$. One standard way to derive our own credence function on the basis of this information is to take a

But now suppose that either Adila or Benoit or both are probabilistically incoherent -- that is, either $c_A(X) + c_A(\overline{X}) \neq 1$ or $c_B(X) + c_B(\overline{X}) \neq 1$ or both. Then, it may well be that the linear pool of their credence functions is also probabilistically incoherent. That is,

$(\alpha c_A(X) + (1-\alpha) c_B(X)) + (\alpha c_A(\overline{X}) + (1-\alpha)c_B(\overline{X})) = $

$\alpha (c_A(X) + c_A(\overline{X})) + (1-\alpha)(c_B(X) + c_B(\overline{X})) \neq 1$

But, as an adherent of Probabilism, I want my credences to be probabilistically coherent. So, what should I do?

A natural suggestion is this: take the aggregated credences in $X$ and $\overline{X}$, and then take the closest pair of credences that are probabilistically coherent. Let's call that process the

But this raises the question: why not first make Adila's and Benoit's credences coherent, and then take the linear pool of the resulting credence functions? Do these two procedures give the same result? That is, in the jargon of algebra, does linear pooling commute with our procedure for making incoherent credences coherent? Does linear pooling commute with coherentization? If so, there is no problem. But if not, our judgment aggregation method faces a dilemma: in which order should the procedures be performed: aggregate, then make coherent; or make coherent, then aggregate.

It turns out that whether or not the two commute depends on the distance measure in question. First, suppose we use the so-called

Second, suppose we use the

Thus, Theorem 1 tells us that, if you measure distance using SED, then no dilemma arises: you can aggregate and then make coherent, or you can make coherent and then aggregate -- they will have the same outcome. However, Theorem 2 tells us that, if you measure distance using GKL, then a dilemma does arise: aggregating and then making coherent gives a different outcome from making coherent and then aggregating.

Perhaps this is an argument against GKL and in favour of SED? You might think, of course, that the problem arises here only because SED is somehow naturally paired with linear pooling, while GKL might be naturally paired with some other method of aggregation such that that method of aggregation commutes with coherentization relative to GKL. That may be so. But bear in mind that there is a very general argument in favour of linear pooling that applies whichever distance measure you use: it says that if you do not aggregate a set of probabilistic credence functions using linear pooling then there is some linear pool that each of those credence functions expects to be more accurate than your aggregation. So I think this response won't work.

*linear pool*or*weighted average*of Adila's and Benoit's credence functions. That is, we assign a weight to Adila ($\alpha$) and a weight to Benoit ($1-\alpha$) and we take the linear combination of their credence functions with these weights to be our credence function. So my credence in $X$ will be $\alpha c_A(X) + (1-\alpha) c_B(X)$, while my credence in $\overline{X}$ will be $\alpha c_A(\overline{X}) + (1-\alpha)c_B(\overline{X})$.But now suppose that either Adila or Benoit or both are probabilistically incoherent -- that is, either $c_A(X) + c_A(\overline{X}) \neq 1$ or $c_B(X) + c_B(\overline{X}) \neq 1$ or both. Then, it may well be that the linear pool of their credence functions is also probabilistically incoherent. That is,

$(\alpha c_A(X) + (1-\alpha) c_B(X)) + (\alpha c_A(\overline{X}) + (1-\alpha)c_B(\overline{X})) = $

$\alpha (c_A(X) + c_A(\overline{X})) + (1-\alpha)(c_B(X) + c_B(\overline{X})) \neq 1$

But, as an adherent of Probabilism, I want my credences to be probabilistically coherent. So, what should I do?

A natural suggestion is this: take the aggregated credences in $X$ and $\overline{X}$, and then take the closest pair of credences that are probabilistically coherent. Let's call that process the

*coherentization*of the incoherent credences. Of course, to carry out this process, we need a measure of distance between any two credence functions. Luckily, that's easy to come by. Suppose you are an adherent of Probabilism because you are persuaded by the so-called accuracy dominance arguments for that norm. According to these arguments, we measure the accuracy of a credence function by measuring its proximity to the ideal credence function, which we take to be the credence function that assigns credence 1 to all truths and credence 0 to all falsehoods. That is, we generate a measure of the accuracy of a credence function from a measure of the distance between two credence functions. Let's call that distance measure $D$. In the accuracy-first literature, there are reasons for taking $D$ to be a so-called*Bregman divergence*. Given such a measure $D$, we might be tempted to say that, if Adila and/or Benoit are incoherent and our linear pool of their credences is incoherent, we should*not*adopt that linear pool as our credence function, since it violates Probabilism, but rather we should find the nearest coherent credence function to the incoherent linear pool, relative to $D$, and adopt that. That is, we should adopt credence function $c$ such that $D(c, \alpha c_A + (1-\alpha)c_B)$ is minimal. So, we should first take the linear pool of Adila's and Benoit's credences; and then we should make them coherent.But this raises the question: why not first make Adila's and Benoit's credences coherent, and then take the linear pool of the resulting credence functions? Do these two procedures give the same result? That is, in the jargon of algebra, does linear pooling commute with our procedure for making incoherent credences coherent? Does linear pooling commute with coherentization? If so, there is no problem. But if not, our judgment aggregation method faces a dilemma: in which order should the procedures be performed: aggregate, then make coherent; or make coherent, then aggregate.

It turns out that whether or not the two commute depends on the distance measure in question. First, suppose we use the so-called

*squared Euclidean distance*measure. That is, for two credence functions $c$, $c'$ defined on a set of propositions $X_1$, $\ldots$, $X_n$,$$SED(c, c') = \sum^n_{i=1} (c(X_i) - c'(X_i))^2$$ In particular, if $c$, $c'$ are defined on $X$, $\overline{X}$, then the distance from $c$ to $c'$ is $$(c(X) -c'(X))^2 + (c(\overline{X})-c'(\overline{X})^2$$ And note that this generates the*quadratic scoring rule*, which is strictly proper:- $\mathfrak{q}(1, x) = (1-x)^2$
- $\mathfrak{q}(0, x) = x^2$

**Theorem 1**For all $\alpha$, $c_A$, $c_B$, $$\alpha c^*_A + (1-\alpha)c^*_B = (\alpha c_A + (1-\alpha)c_B)^*$$Second, suppose we use the

*generalized Kullback-Leibler divergence*to measure the distance between credence functions. That is, for two credence functions $c$, $c'$ defined on a set of propositions $X_1$, $\ldots$, $X_n$,$$GKL(c, c') = \sum^n_{i=1} c(X_i) \mathrm{log}\frac{c(X_i)}{c'(X_i)} - \sum^n_{i=1} c(X_i) + \sum^n_{i=1} c'(X_i)$$ Thus, for $c$, $c'$ defined on $X$, $\overline{X}$, the distance from $c$ to $'$ is $$c(X)\mathrm{log}\frac{c(X)}{c'(X)} + c(\overline{X})\mathrm{log}\frac{c(\overline{X})}{c'(\overline{X})} - c(X) - c(\overline{X}) + c'(X) + c'(\overline{X})$$ And note that this generates the following scoring rule, which is strictly proper:- $\mathfrak{b}(1, x) = \mathrm{log}(\frac{1}{x}) - 1 + x$
- $\mathfrak{b}(0, x) = x$

*does not*commute with our procedure for making incoherent credences coherent. Given a credence function $c$, let $c^+$ be the closest coherent credence function to $c$ relative to $GKL$. Then:**Theorem 2**For many $\alpha$, $c_A$, $c_B$, $$\alpha c^+_A + (1-\alpha)c^+_B \neq (\alpha c_A + (1-\alpha)c_B)^+$$*Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2*. With the following two key facts in hand, the results are straightforward. If $c$ is defined on $X$, $\overline{X}$:- $c^*(X) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{c(X)-c(\overline{X})}{2}$, $c^*(\overline{X}) = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{c(X) - c(\overline{X})}{2}$.
- $c^+(X) = \frac{c(X)}{c(X) + c(\overline{X})}$, $c^+(\overline{X}) = \frac{c(\overline{X})}{c(X) + c(\overline{X})}$.

Thus, Theorem 1 tells us that, if you measure distance using SED, then no dilemma arises: you can aggregate and then make coherent, or you can make coherent and then aggregate -- they will have the same outcome. However, Theorem 2 tells us that, if you measure distance using GKL, then a dilemma does arise: aggregating and then making coherent gives a different outcome from making coherent and then aggregating.

Perhaps this is an argument against GKL and in favour of SED? You might think, of course, that the problem arises here only because SED is somehow naturally paired with linear pooling, while GKL might be naturally paired with some other method of aggregation such that that method of aggregation commutes with coherentization relative to GKL. That may be so. But bear in mind that there is a very general argument in favour of linear pooling that applies whichever distance measure you use: it says that if you do not aggregate a set of probabilistic credence functions using linear pooling then there is some linear pool that each of those credence functions expects to be more accurate than your aggregation. So I think this response won't work.

## Wednesday, 1 March 2017

### More on the Swamping Problem for Reliabilism

In a previous post, I floated the possibility that we might use recent work in decision theory by Orri Stefánsson and Richard Bradley to solve the so-called Swamping Problem for veritism. In this post, I'll show that, in fact, this putative solution can't work.

According to the Swamping Problem, I value beliefs that are both justified and true more than I value beliefs that are true but unjustified; and, we might suppose, I value beliefs that are justified but false more than I value beliefs that are both unjustified and false. In other words, I care about the truth or falsity or my beliefs; but I also care about their justification. Now, suppose we take the view, which I defend in this earlier post, that a belief in a proposition is more justified the higher the objective probability of that proposition given the grounds for that belief. Thus, for instance, if I base my belief that there was a firecrest in front of me until a few seconds ago on the fact that I saw a flash of orange as the bird flew off, then my belief is more justified the higher the objective probability that it was a firecrest given that I saw a flash of orange. And, whether there really was a firecrest in front of me, the value of my belief increases as the objective probability that there was given I saw a flash of orange increases.

Let's translate this into Stefánsson and Bradley's version of Richard Jeffrey's decision theory. Here are the components:

The Swamping Problem then continues by noting that, if (1) or (2) is true, then my desirability function violates Chance Neutrality. Therefore, it concludes, I am irrational.

However, as Stefánsson and Bradley show, Chance Neutrality is not a requirement of rationality. To do this, they consider a further putative principle, which they call Linearity:

They then argue that, since Linearity is not a rational requirement, neither can Chance Neutrality be -- since the Principal Principle is a rational requirement, if Chance Neutrality were too, then Linearity would be; and Linearity is not because it is violated in cases of rational preference, such as in the Allais paradox.

Thus, the Swamping Problem in its original form fails. It relies on Chance Neutrality, but Chance Neutrality is not a requirement of rationality. Of course, if we could prove a sort of converse of Stefánsson and Bradley's result, and show that, in the presence of the Principal Principle, Linearity entails Chance Neutrality, then we could show that a value function satisfying (1) is irrational. But we can't prove that converse.

Nonetheless, there is still a problem. For we can show that, in the presence of Desirability and the Principal Principle, Linearity entails that there is no desirability function $V$ that satisfies (1). Of course, given that Linearity is not a requirement of rationality, this does not tell us very much at the moment. But it does when we realise that, while Linearity is not required by rationality, veritists who accept the reliabilist account of justification given above typically do have a desirability function that satisfies Linearity. After all, they value a justified belief because it is reliable -- that is, it has high objective expected epistemic value. That is, they value a belief at its expected epistemic value, which is precisely what Linearity says.

According to the Swamping Problem, I value beliefs that are both justified and true more than I value beliefs that are true but unjustified; and, we might suppose, I value beliefs that are justified but false more than I value beliefs that are both unjustified and false. In other words, I care about the truth or falsity or my beliefs; but I also care about their justification. Now, suppose we take the view, which I defend in this earlier post, that a belief in a proposition is more justified the higher the objective probability of that proposition given the grounds for that belief. Thus, for instance, if I base my belief that there was a firecrest in front of me until a few seconds ago on the fact that I saw a flash of orange as the bird flew off, then my belief is more justified the higher the objective probability that it was a firecrest given that I saw a flash of orange. And, whether there really was a firecrest in front of me, the value of my belief increases as the objective probability that there was given I saw a flash of orange increases.

Let's translate this into Stefánsson and Bradley's version of Richard Jeffrey's decision theory. Here are the components:

- a Boolean algebra $F$
- a desirability function $V$, defined on $F$
- a credence function $c$, defined on $F$

**Desirability**For any partition $X_1$, ..., $X_n$, $$V(X) = \sum^n_{i=1} c(X_i | X)V(X\ \&\ X_i)$$ And, further, we assume Lewis' Principal Principle, where $C^x_X$ is the proposition that says that $X$ has objective probability $x$:**Principal Principle**$$c(X_j | \bigwedge^n_{i=1} C^{x_i}_{X_i}) = x_i$$ Now, suppose I believe proposition $X$. Then, from what we said above, we can extract the following:- $V(X\ \&\ C^x_X)$ is a monotone increasing and non-constant function of $x$, for $0 \leq x \leq 1$
- $V(X\ \&\ C^x_X)$ is a monotone increasing and non-constant function of $x$, for $0 \leq x \leq 1$
- $V(X\ \&\ C^x_X) > V(\overline{X}\ \&\ C^x_X)$, for $0 \leq x \leq 1$.

**Chance Neutrality**$$V(X_j\ \&\ \bigwedge^n_{i=1} C^{x_i}_{X_i}) = V(X)$$ Or, equivalently:**Chance Neutrality$^*$**$$V(X_j\ \&\ \bigwedge^n_{i=1} C^{x_i}_{X_i}) = V(X_j\ \&\ \bigwedge^n_{i=1} C^{x'_i}_{X_i})$$ This says that the truth of $X$ swamps the chance of $X$ in determining the value of an outcome. With the truth of $X$ fixed, its chance of being true becomes irrelevant.The Swamping Problem then continues by noting that, if (1) or (2) is true, then my desirability function violates Chance Neutrality. Therefore, it concludes, I am irrational.

However, as Stefánsson and Bradley show, Chance Neutrality is not a requirement of rationality. To do this, they consider a further putative principle, which they call Linearity:

**Linearity**$$V(\bigwedge^n_{i=1} C^{x_i}_{X_i}) = \sum^n_{i=1} x_iV(X_i)$$ Now, Stefánsson and Bradley show**Theorem***Suppose Desirability and the Principal Principle. Then Chance Neutrality entails Linearity.*They then argue that, since Linearity is not a rational requirement, neither can Chance Neutrality be -- since the Principal Principle is a rational requirement, if Chance Neutrality were too, then Linearity would be; and Linearity is not because it is violated in cases of rational preference, such as in the Allais paradox.

Thus, the Swamping Problem in its original form fails. It relies on Chance Neutrality, but Chance Neutrality is not a requirement of rationality. Of course, if we could prove a sort of converse of Stefánsson and Bradley's result, and show that, in the presence of the Principal Principle, Linearity entails Chance Neutrality, then we could show that a value function satisfying (1) is irrational. But we can't prove that converse.

Nonetheless, there is still a problem. For we can show that, in the presence of Desirability and the Principal Principle, Linearity entails that there is no desirability function $V$ that satisfies (1). Of course, given that Linearity is not a requirement of rationality, this does not tell us very much at the moment. But it does when we realise that, while Linearity is not required by rationality, veritists who accept the reliabilist account of justification given above typically do have a desirability function that satisfies Linearity. After all, they value a justified belief because it is reliable -- that is, it has high objective expected epistemic value. That is, they value a belief at its expected epistemic value, which is precisely what Linearity says.

**Theorem***Suppose $X$ is a proposition in $F$. And suppose $V$ satisfies Desirability, Principal Principle, and Linearity. Then it is not possible that the following are all satisfied:**(Monotonicity) $V(X\ \&\ C^x_X)$ and $V(\overline{X}\ \&\ C^x_X)$ are both monotone increasing and non-constant functions of $x$ on $(0, 1)$;**(Betweenness) There is $0 < x < 1$ such that $V(X) < V(X\ \&\ C^x_X)$*.

*Proof*. We suppose Desirability, Principal Principle, and Linearity throughout. We proceed by reductio. We make the following abbreviations:- $f(x) = V(X\ \&\ C^x_X)$
- $g(x) = V(\overline{X}\ \&\ C^x_X)$
- $F = V(X)$
- $G = V(\overline{X})$

- (1f) $f$ is a monotone increasing and non-constant function on $(0, 1)$ (by Monotonicity);
- (1g) $g$ is a monotone increasing and non-constant function on $(0, 1)$ (by Monotonicity);
- (2) There is $0 < x < 1$ such that $F < f(x)$ (by Betweenness).

- (3) $xF + (1-x)G = xf(x) + (1-x)g(x)$

## Sunday, 12 February 2017

### Chance Neutrality and the Swamping Problem for Reliabilism

Reliabilism about justified belief comes in two varieties: process reliabilism and indicator reliabilism. According to process reliabilism, a belief is justified if it is formed by a process that is likely to produce truths; according to indicator reliabilism, a belief is justified if it likely to be true given the ground on which the belief is based. Both are natural accounts of justification for a veritist, who holds that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for a belief is its truth.

Against veritists who are reliabilists, opponents raise the Swamping Problem. This begins with the observation that we prefer a justified true belief to an unjustified true belief; we ascribe greater value to the former than to the latter; we would prefer to have the former over the latter. But, if reliablism is true, this means that we prefer a belief that is true and had a high chance of being true over a belief that is true and had a low chance of being true. For a veritist, this means that we prefer a belief that has maximal epistemic value and had a high chance of having maximal epistemic value over a belief that has maximal epistemic value and had a low chance of having maximal epistemic value. And this is irrational, or so the objection goes. It is only rational to value a high chance of maximal utility when the actual utility is not known; once the actual utility is known, this 'swamps' any consideration of the chance of that utility. For instance, suppose I find a lottery ticket on the street; I know that it comes either from a 10-ticket lottery or from a 100-ticket lottery; both lotteries pay out the same amount to the holder of the winning ticket; and I know the outcome of neither lottery. Then it is rational for me to hope that the ticket I hold belongs to the smaller lottery, since that would maximise my chance of winning and thus maximise the expected utility of the ticket. But once I know that the lottery ticket I found is the winning ticket, it is irrational to prefer that it came from the smaller lottery --- my knowledge that it's the winner 'swamps' the information about how likely it was to be the winner. This is known variously as the Swamping Problem or the Value Problem for reliabilism about justification (Zagzebski 2003, Kvanvig 2003).

The central assumption of the swamping problem is a principle that, in a different context, H. Orri Stefánsson and Richard Bradley call Chance Neutrality (Stefánsson & Bradley 2015). They state it precisely within the framework of Richard Jeffrey's decision theory (Jeffrey 1983). In that framework, we have a desirability function $V$ and a credence function $c$, both of which are defined on an algebra of propositions $\mathcal{F}$. $V(A)$ measures how strongly our agent desires $A$, or how greatly she values it. $c(A)$ measures how strongly she believes $A$, or her credence in $A$. The central principle of the decision theory is this:

Now, suppose the algebra on which $V$ and $c$ are defined includes some propositions that concern the objective probabilities of other propositions in the algebra. Then:

That is, information about the outcome of the chance process that picks between $X_1$, $\ldots$, $X_n$ `swamps' information about the chance process in our evaluation, which is recorded in $V$. A simple consequence of this: if $0 \leq \alpha_1, \alpha'_1 \ldots, \alpha_n, \alpha'_n \leq 1$ and $\sum^n_{i=1} \alpha_i = 1$ and $\sum^n_{i=1} \alpha'_i = 1$, then

$V(X\ \&\ \bigwedge^n_{i=1} \mbox{Objective probability of $X_i$ is $\alpha_i$}) = $

$V(X\ \&\ \bigwedge^n_{i=1} \mbox{Objective probability of $X_i$ is $\alpha'_i$})$

Now consider the particular case of this that is used in the Swamping Problem. I believe $X$ on the basis of ground $g$. I assign greater value to $X$ being true and justified than I do to $X$ being true and unjustified. That is, given the reliabilist's account of justification, if $\alpha$ is a probability that lies above the threshold for justification and $\alpha'$ is a probability that lies below that threshold --- for the veritist, $\alpha' < \frac{W}{R+W} < \alpha$ --- then

$V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha'$}) <$

$V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$

And of course this violates Chance Neutrality.

Thus, the Swamping Problem stands or falls with the status of Chance Neutrality. Is it a requirement of rationality? Stefánsson and Bradley argue that it is not (Section 3, Stefánsson & Bradley 2015). They show that, in the presence of the Principal Principle, Chance Neutrality entails a principle called Linearity; and they claim that Linearity is not a requirement of rationality. If it is permissible to violate Linearity, then it cannot be a requirement to satisfy a principle that entails it. So Chance Neutrality is not a requirement of rationality.

In this context, the Principal Principle runs as follows:

That is, an agent's credence in $X_i$, conditional on information that gives the objective probability of $X_i$ and other members of a partition to which it belongs, should be equal to the objective probability of $X_i$. And Linearity is the following principle:

That is, an agent should value a lottery at the expected value of its outcome. Now, as is well known, real agents often violate Linearity (Buchak 2014). The most famous violations are known as the Allais preferences (Allais 1953). Suppose there are 100 tickets numbered 1 to 100. One ticket will be drawn and you will be given a prize depending on which option you have chosen from $L_1$, $\ldots$, $L_4$:

When there is an option that guarantees them a high payout (\pounds 1m), they prefer that over something with 1% chance of nothing (\pounds 0) even if it also provides 10% chance of much greater payout (£5m). On the other hand, when there is no guarantee of a high payout, they prefer the chance of the much greater payout (\pounds 5m), even if there is also a slightly greater chance of nothing (£0). The problem is that there is no way to assign values to $V(£0)$, $V(£1m)$, and $V(£5m)$ so that $V$ satisfies Linearity and also these inequalities. Suppose, for a reductio, that there is. By Linearity,

$$V(L_1) = 0.89V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.1 V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£1\mathrm{m})$$

$$V(L_2) = 0.89V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.1 V(£5\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£0\mathrm{m}) $$

Then, since $V(L_1) > V(L_2)$, we have: $$0.1 V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£1\mathrm{m}) > 0.1 V(£5\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£0\mathrm{m})$$ But also by Linearity, $$V(L_3) = 0.89V(£0\mathrm{m}) + 0.1 V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£1\mathrm{m})$$

$$V(L_4) = 0.89V(£0\mathrm{m}) + 0.1 V(£5\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£0\mathrm{m})$$

Then, since $V(L_3) < V(L_4)$, we have: $$0.1 V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£1\mathrm{m}) < 0.1 V(£5\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£0\mathrm{m})$$

And this gives a contradiction. In general, an agent violates Linearity when she has any risk averse or risk seeking preferences.

Stefánsson and Bradley show that, in the presence of the Principal Principle, Chance Neutrality entails Linearity; and they argue that there are rational violations of Linearity (such as the Allais preferences); so they conclude that there are rational violations of Chance Neutrality. So far, so good for the reliabilist: the Swamping Problem assumes that Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality; and we have seen that it is not. However, reliabilism is not out of the woods yet. After all, the veritist's version of reliabilism that in fact assumes Linearity! They say that a belief is justified if it is likely to true. And they say this because a belief that is likely to be true has high expected epistemic value on the veritist's account of epistemic value. And so they connect justification to epistemic value by taking the value of a belief to be its expected epistemic value --- that is, they assume Linearity. Thus, if the only rational violations of Chance Neutrality are also rational violations of Linearity, then the Swamping Problem is revived. In particular, if Linearity entails Chance Neutrality, then reliabilism cannot solve the Swamping Problem.

Fortunately, even in the presence of the Principal Principle, Linearity does not entail Chance Neutrality. Together, the Principal Principle and Desirability entail:

$V(\mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$}) =$

$\alpha V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$}) + $

$(1-\alpha) V(\overline{X}\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$

And Linearity entails:

$V(\mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$}) = \alpha V(X) + (1-\alpha) V(\overline{X})$

So

$\alpha V(X) + (1-\alpha) V(\overline{X}) =$

$\alpha V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$}) + $

$(1-\alpha) V(\overline{X}\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$

And, whatever the values of $V(X)$ and $V(\overline{X})$, there are values of $$V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$$ and $$V(\overline{X}\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$$

such that the above equation holds. Thus, it is at least possible to adhere to Linearity, yet violate Chance Neutrality. Of course, this does not show that the agent who adheres to Linearity but violates Chance Neutrality is rational. But, now that the intuitive appeal of Chance Neutrality is undermined, the burden is on those who raise the Swamping Problem to explain why such cases are irrational.

Against veritists who are reliabilists, opponents raise the Swamping Problem. This begins with the observation that we prefer a justified true belief to an unjustified true belief; we ascribe greater value to the former than to the latter; we would prefer to have the former over the latter. But, if reliablism is true, this means that we prefer a belief that is true and had a high chance of being true over a belief that is true and had a low chance of being true. For a veritist, this means that we prefer a belief that has maximal epistemic value and had a high chance of having maximal epistemic value over a belief that has maximal epistemic value and had a low chance of having maximal epistemic value. And this is irrational, or so the objection goes. It is only rational to value a high chance of maximal utility when the actual utility is not known; once the actual utility is known, this 'swamps' any consideration of the chance of that utility. For instance, suppose I find a lottery ticket on the street; I know that it comes either from a 10-ticket lottery or from a 100-ticket lottery; both lotteries pay out the same amount to the holder of the winning ticket; and I know the outcome of neither lottery. Then it is rational for me to hope that the ticket I hold belongs to the smaller lottery, since that would maximise my chance of winning and thus maximise the expected utility of the ticket. But once I know that the lottery ticket I found is the winning ticket, it is irrational to prefer that it came from the smaller lottery --- my knowledge that it's the winner 'swamps' the information about how likely it was to be the winner. This is known variously as the Swamping Problem or the Value Problem for reliabilism about justification (Zagzebski 2003, Kvanvig 2003).

The central assumption of the swamping problem is a principle that, in a different context, H. Orri Stefánsson and Richard Bradley call Chance Neutrality (Stefánsson & Bradley 2015). They state it precisely within the framework of Richard Jeffrey's decision theory (Jeffrey 1983). In that framework, we have a desirability function $V$ and a credence function $c$, both of which are defined on an algebra of propositions $\mathcal{F}$. $V(A)$ measures how strongly our agent desires $A$, or how greatly she values it. $c(A)$ measures how strongly she believes $A$, or her credence in $A$. The central principle of the decision theory is this:

**Desirability**If the propositions $A_1$, $\ldots$, $A_n$ form a partition of the proposition $X$, then $$V(X) = \sum^n_{i=1} c(A_i | X) V(A_i)$$Now, suppose the algebra on which $V$ and $c$ are defined includes some propositions that concern the objective probabilities of other propositions in the algebra. Then:

**Chance Neutrality**Suppose $X$ is in the partition $X_1$, \ldots, $X_n$. And suppose $0 \leq \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_n \leq 1$ and $\sum^n_{i=1} \alpha = 1$. Then $$V(X\ \&\ \bigwedge^n_{i=1} \mbox{Objective probability of $X_i$ is $\alpha_i$}) = V(X)$$That is, information about the outcome of the chance process that picks between $X_1$, $\ldots$, $X_n$ `swamps' information about the chance process in our evaluation, which is recorded in $V$. A simple consequence of this: if $0 \leq \alpha_1, \alpha'_1 \ldots, \alpha_n, \alpha'_n \leq 1$ and $\sum^n_{i=1} \alpha_i = 1$ and $\sum^n_{i=1} \alpha'_i = 1$, then

$V(X\ \&\ \bigwedge^n_{i=1} \mbox{Objective probability of $X_i$ is $\alpha_i$}) = $

$V(X\ \&\ \bigwedge^n_{i=1} \mbox{Objective probability of $X_i$ is $\alpha'_i$})$

Now consider the particular case of this that is used in the Swamping Problem. I believe $X$ on the basis of ground $g$. I assign greater value to $X$ being true and justified than I do to $X$ being true and unjustified. That is, given the reliabilist's account of justification, if $\alpha$ is a probability that lies above the threshold for justification and $\alpha'$ is a probability that lies below that threshold --- for the veritist, $\alpha' < \frac{W}{R+W} < \alpha$ --- then

$V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha'$}) <$

$V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$

And of course this violates Chance Neutrality.

Thus, the Swamping Problem stands or falls with the status of Chance Neutrality. Is it a requirement of rationality? Stefánsson and Bradley argue that it is not (Section 3, Stefánsson & Bradley 2015). They show that, in the presence of the Principal Principle, Chance Neutrality entails a principle called Linearity; and they claim that Linearity is not a requirement of rationality. If it is permissible to violate Linearity, then it cannot be a requirement to satisfy a principle that entails it. So Chance Neutrality is not a requirement of rationality.

In this context, the Principal Principle runs as follows:

**Principal Principle**$$c(X_i | \bigwedge^n_{i=1} \mbox{Objective probability of $X_i$ is $\alpha_i$}) = \alpha_i$$That is, an agent's credence in $X_i$, conditional on information that gives the objective probability of $X_i$ and other members of a partition to which it belongs, should be equal to the objective probability of $X_i$. And Linearity is the following principle:

**Linearity**$$V(\bigwedge^n_{i=1} \mbox{Objective probability of $X_i$ is $\alpha_i$}) = \sum^n_{i=1} \alpha_iV(X_i)$$That is, an agent should value a lottery at the expected value of its outcome. Now, as is well known, real agents often violate Linearity (Buchak 2014). The most famous violations are known as the Allais preferences (Allais 1953). Suppose there are 100 tickets numbered 1 to 100. One ticket will be drawn and you will be given a prize depending on which option you have chosen from $L_1$, $\ldots$, $L_4$:

- $L_1$: if ticket 1-89, £1m; if ticket 90-99, £1m; if ticket 100, £1m.
- $L_2$: if ticket 1-89, £1m; if ticket 90-99, £5m; if ticket 100, £0m
- $L_3$: if ticket 1-89, £0m; if ticket 90-99, £1m; if ticket 100, £1m
- $L_4$: if ticket 1-89, £0m; if ticket 90-99, £5m; if ticket 100, £0m

When there is an option that guarantees them a high payout (\pounds 1m), they prefer that over something with 1% chance of nothing (\pounds 0) even if it also provides 10% chance of much greater payout (£5m). On the other hand, when there is no guarantee of a high payout, they prefer the chance of the much greater payout (\pounds 5m), even if there is also a slightly greater chance of nothing (£0). The problem is that there is no way to assign values to $V(£0)$, $V(£1m)$, and $V(£5m)$ so that $V$ satisfies Linearity and also these inequalities. Suppose, for a reductio, that there is. By Linearity,

$$V(L_1) = 0.89V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.1 V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£1\mathrm{m})$$

$$V(L_2) = 0.89V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.1 V(£5\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£0\mathrm{m}) $$

Then, since $V(L_1) > V(L_2)$, we have: $$0.1 V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£1\mathrm{m}) > 0.1 V(£5\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£0\mathrm{m})$$ But also by Linearity, $$V(L_3) = 0.89V(£0\mathrm{m}) + 0.1 V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£1\mathrm{m})$$

$$V(L_4) = 0.89V(£0\mathrm{m}) + 0.1 V(£5\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£0\mathrm{m})$$

Then, since $V(L_3) < V(L_4)$, we have: $$0.1 V(£1\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£1\mathrm{m}) < 0.1 V(£5\mathrm{m}) + 0.01 V(£0\mathrm{m})$$

And this gives a contradiction. In general, an agent violates Linearity when she has any risk averse or risk seeking preferences.

Stefánsson and Bradley show that, in the presence of the Principal Principle, Chance Neutrality entails Linearity; and they argue that there are rational violations of Linearity (such as the Allais preferences); so they conclude that there are rational violations of Chance Neutrality. So far, so good for the reliabilist: the Swamping Problem assumes that Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality; and we have seen that it is not. However, reliabilism is not out of the woods yet. After all, the veritist's version of reliabilism that in fact assumes Linearity! They say that a belief is justified if it is likely to true. And they say this because a belief that is likely to be true has high expected epistemic value on the veritist's account of epistemic value. And so they connect justification to epistemic value by taking the value of a belief to be its expected epistemic value --- that is, they assume Linearity. Thus, if the only rational violations of Chance Neutrality are also rational violations of Linearity, then the Swamping Problem is revived. In particular, if Linearity entails Chance Neutrality, then reliabilism cannot solve the Swamping Problem.

Fortunately, even in the presence of the Principal Principle, Linearity does not entail Chance Neutrality. Together, the Principal Principle and Desirability entail:

$V(\mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$}) =$

$\alpha V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$}) + $

$(1-\alpha) V(\overline{X}\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$

And Linearity entails:

$V(\mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$}) = \alpha V(X) + (1-\alpha) V(\overline{X})$

So

$\alpha V(X) + (1-\alpha) V(\overline{X}) =$

$\alpha V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$}) + $

$(1-\alpha) V(\overline{X}\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$

And, whatever the values of $V(X)$ and $V(\overline{X})$, there are values of $$V(X\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$$ and $$V(\overline{X}\ \&\ \mbox{Objective probability of $X$ given I have $g$ is $\alpha$})$$

such that the above equation holds. Thus, it is at least possible to adhere to Linearity, yet violate Chance Neutrality. Of course, this does not show that the agent who adheres to Linearity but violates Chance Neutrality is rational. But, now that the intuitive appeal of Chance Neutrality is undermined, the burden is on those who raise the Swamping Problem to explain why such cases are irrational.

## References

- Allais, M. (1953). Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l'école Amáricaine. Econometrica, 21(4), 503–546.
- Buchak, L. (2013). Risk and Rationality. Oxford University Press.
- Kvanvig, J. (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stefánsson, H. O., & Bradley, R. (2015). How Valuable Are Chances? Philosophy of Science, 82, 602–625.
- Zagzebski, L. (2003). The search for the source of the epistemic good. Metaphilosophy, 34(12-28).

## Monday, 6 February 2017

### What is justified credence?

Aafira and Halim are both 90% confident that it will be sunny tomorrow. Aafira bases her credence on her observation of the weather today and her past experience of the weather on days that follow days like today -- around nine out of ten of them have been sunny. Halim bases his credence on wishful thinking -- he's arranged a garden party for tomorrow and he desperately wants the weather to be pleasant. Aafira, it seems, is justified in her credence, while Halim is not. Just as one of your full or categorical beliefs might be justified if it is based on visual perception under good conditions, or on memories of recent important events, or on testimony from experts, so might one of your credences be; and just as one of your full beliefs might be unjustified if it is based on wishful thinking, or biased stereotypical associations, or testimony from ideologically driven news outlets, so might your credences be. In this post, I'm looking for an account of justified credence -- in particular, I seek necessary and sufficient conditions for a credence to be justified. Our account will be reliabilist.

Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism and indicator reliabilism. Roughly, process reliabilism says that a belief is justified if it is formed by a reliable process, while indicator reliabilism says that a belief is justified if it is based on a ground that renders it likely. Reliabilism about justified credence also comes in two varieties; indeed, it comes in the same two varieties. And, indeed, of the two existing proposals, Jeff Dunn's is a version of process reliabilism (paper) while Weng Hong Tang offers a version of indicator reliabilism (paper). As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification is, it is mysterious why we care about justification, for neither of the accounts connects justification to a source of epistemic value. We will call this the

I begin by describing Dunn's process reliabilism and Tang's indicator reliabilism. I argue that, understood correctly, they are, in fact, extensionally equivalent. That is, Dunn and Tang reach the top of the same mountain, albeit by different routes. However, I argue that both face the Connection Problem. In response, I offer my own version of reliabilism, which is both process and indicator, and I argue that it solves that problem. Furthermore, I show that it is also extensionally equivalent to Dunn's reliabilism and Tang's.

Let us begin with Dunn's process reliabilism for justified credences. Now, to be clear, Dunn takes himself only to be providing an account of reliability for credence-forming processes. He doesn't necessarily endorse the other two conjuncts of reliabilism, which say that a credence is justified if it is reliable, and that a credence is reliable if formed by a reliable process. Instead, Dunn speculates that perhaps being reliably formed is but one of the epistemic virtues, and he wonders whether all of the epistemic virtues are required for justification. Nonetheless, I will consider a version of reliabilism for justified credences that is based on Dunn's account of reliable credence. For reasons that will become clear, I will call this the calibrationist version of process reliabilism for justified credence. Dunn rejects it based on what I will call below the

For Dunn, a credence-forming process is perfectly reliable if it is well calibrated. Here's what it means for a process $\rho$ to be well calibrated:

This, then, is Dunn's calibrationist account of the reliability of a credence-forming process. Any version of reliabilism about justified credences that is based on it requires two further ingredients. First, we must use the account to say when an individual credence is reliable; second, we must add the claim that a credence is justified iff it is reliable. Both of these moves creates problems. We will address them below. But first it will be useful to present Tang's version of indicator reliabilism for justified credence. It will provide an important clue that helps us solve one of the problems that Dunn's account faces. And, having it in hand, it will be easier to see how these two accounts end up coinciding.

According to indicator reliabilism for justified belief, a belief is justified if the ground on which it is based is a good indicator of the truth of that belief. Thus, beliefs formed on the basis of visual experiences tend to be justified because the fact that the agent had the visual experience in question makes it likely that the belief they based on it is true. Wishful thinking, on the other hand, usually does not give rise to justified belief because the fact that an agent hopes that a particular proposition will be true -- which in this case is the ground of their belief -- does not make it likely that the proposition is true.

Tang seeks to extend this account of justified belief to the case of credence. Here is his first attempt at an account:

(TIC1-$\alpha$) $S$ has ground $g$;

(TIC2-$\alpha$) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $E$;

(TIC3-$\alpha$) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g$ approximates or equals $x$ -- we write this $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$.

Thus, just as an agent's full belief in a proposition is justified if its ground makes the objective probability of that proposition close to 1, a credence $x$ in a proposition is justified if its ground makes the objective probability of that proposition close to $x$. There is a substantial problem here in identifying exactly to which notion of objective probability Tang wishes to appeal. But we will leave that aside for the moment, other than to say that he conceives of it along the lines of hypothetical frequentism -- that is, the objective probability of $X$ given $Y$ is the hypothetical frequency with which propositions like $X$ are true when propositions like $Y$ are true.

However, as Tang notes, as stated, his version of indicator reliabilism faces a problem. Suppose I am presented with an empty urn. I watch as it is filled with 100 balls, numbered 1 to 100, half of which are white, and half of which are black. I shake the urn vigorously and extract a ball. It's number 73 and it's white. I look at its colour and the numeral printed on it. I have a visual experience of a white ball with '73' on it. On the basis of my visual experience of the numeral alone, I assign credence 0.5 to the proposition that ball 73 is white. According to Wang's first version of indicator reliabilism for justified credence, my credence is justified. My ground is the visual experience of the number on the ball; I have that ground; I base my credence on that ground; and the objective probability that ball 73 is white given that I have a visual experience of the numeral '73' printed on it is 50% -- after all, half the balls are white. Of course, the problem is that I have not used my total evidence -- or, in the language of grounds, I have not based my belief on my most inclusive ground. I had the visual experience of the numeral on the ball as a ground; but I also had the visual experience of the numeral on the ball

(TIC1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(TIC2) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(TIC3) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g$ approximates or equals $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$;

(TIC4) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (i) $S$ has $g'$ and (ii) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g'$ does not equal or approximate $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g'$}) \not \approx x$.

This, then, is Tang's version of indicator reliabilism for justified credences.

Thus, we have now seen Dunn's process reliabilism and Tang's indicator reliabilism for justified credences. Is either correct? If so, which? In one sense, both are correct; in another, neither is. Less mysteriously: as we will see in this section, Dunn's process reliablism and Tang's indicator reliabilism are extensionally equivalent -- that is, the same credences are justified on both. What's more, as we will see in the final section, both are extensionally equivalent to the correct account of justified credence, which is thus a version of both process and indicator reliabilism. However, while they get the extension right, they do so for the wrong reasons. A justified credence is not justified because it is formed by a well calibrated process; and it is not justified because it matches the objective chance given its grounds. Thus, Dunn and Tang delimit the correct extension, but they use the wrong intension. In the final section of this post, I will offer what I take to be the correct intension. But first, let's see why it is that the routes that Dunn and Tang take lead them both to the top of the same mountain.

We begin with Dunn's calibrationist account of the reliability of a credence-forming process. As we noted above, any version of reliabilism about justified credences that is based on this account requires two further ingredients. First, we must use the calibrationist account of reliable credence-forming processes to say when an individual credence is reliable. The natural answer: when it is formed by a reliable credence-forming process. But then we must be able to identify, for a given credence, the process of which it is an output. The problem is that, for any credence, there are a great many processes of which it might be the output. I have a visual experience of a piece of red cloth on my desk, and I form a high credence that there is a piece of red cloth on my desk. Is this credence the output of a process that assigns a high credence that that there is a piece of red cloth on my desk whenever I have that visual experience? Or is it the output of a process that assigns a high credence that there is a piece of red cloth on my desk whenever I have that visual experience

Dunn provides an account of when a credence-forming process is reliable. And, once we have a solution to the Generality Problem, we can use that to say when a credence is reliable -- it is reliable when formed by a reliable credence-forming process. Finally, to complete the version of process reliablism about justified credence that we are basing on Dunn's account, we just need the claim that a credence is justified iff it is reliable. But this too faces a problem, which we call the

Let us consider the Generality Problem first. To this problem, Juan Comesaña offers the following solution (paper). Every account of doxastic justification -- that is, every account of when a given doxastic attitude of a particular agent is justified for that agent -- must recognize that two agents may have the same doxastic attitude and the same evidence while the doxastic attitude of one is justified and the doxastic attitude of the other is not, because their doxastic attitudes are not based on the same evidence. The first might base her belief on the total evidence, for instance, whilst the second ignores that evidence and bases his belief purely on wishful thinking. Thus, Comesaña claims, every theory of justification needs a notion of the grounds or the basis of a doxastic attitude. But, once we have that, a solution to the Generality Problem is very close. Comesaña spells out the solution for process reliabilism about full beliefs:

(WPB1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(WPB2) the belief that $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(WPB3) the process

This is easily adapted to the credal case:

(WPC1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(WPC2) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(WPC3) the process

Let us now try to apply Comesaña's solution to the Generality Problem to help Dunn's calibrationist reliabilism about justified credences. Recall: according to Dunn, a process $\rho$ is reliable if it is well calibrated (or nearly so). Consider the process

(WCPC1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(WCPC2) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(WCPC3) the process

But now compare Well-Founded Calibrationist Process Reliabilism, based on Dunn's account of reliable processes and Comesaña's solution to the Generality Problem, with Tang's first attempt at Indicator Reliabilism. Consider the necessary and sufficient conditions that each imposes for justification: TIC1 = WCPC1; TIC2 = WCPC2; TIC3 = WCPC3. Thus, these are the same account. However, as we saw above, Tang's first attempt to formulate indicator reliabilism for justified credence fails because it counts as justified a credence that is not based on an agent's total evidence; and we also saw that, once the Generality Problem is solved for Dunn's calibrationist process reliabilism, it faces a similar problem, namely, the Graining Problem from above. Tang amends his version of indicator reliabilism by adding the fourth condition TIC4 from above. Might we amend Dunn's calibrationist process reliabilism is a similar way?

(WCPC1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(WCPC2) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(WCPC3) the process

(WCPC4) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ and credence $x' \not \approx x$, such that the process

Since TIC4 is equivalent to WCPC4, this final version of process reliabilism for justified credences is equivalent to Tang's final version of his indicator reliabilism for justified credences. Thus, Dunn and Tang have reached the top of the same mountain, albeit by different routes

Once we have addressed certain problems with the calibrationist version of process reliabilism for justified credence, we see that it agrees with the current best version of indicator reliabilism. This gives us a little hope that both have hit upon the correct account of justification. In the end, I will conclude that both have indeed hit upon the correct

There are two sorts of route you might take when pursuing an account of justification for a given sort of doxastic attitude, such as a credence or a full belief. You might look to intuitions concerning particular cases and try to discern a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that sort these cases in the same way that your intuitions do; or, you might begin with an account of epistemic value, assume that justification must be linked in some natural way to the promotion of epistemic value, and then provide an account of justification that vindicates that assumption. Dunn and Tang have each taken a route of the first sort; I will follow a route of the second sort.

I will adopt the veritist's account of epistemic value. That is, I take accuracy to be the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for a credence, where a credence in a true proposition is more accurate the higher it is; a credence in a false proposition is more accurate the lower it is. Given this account of epistemic value, what is the natural account of justification? Well, at first sight, there are two: one is process reliabilist; the other is indicator reliabilist. But, in a twist that should come as little surprise given the conclusions of the previous section, it will turn out that these two accounts coincide, and indeed coincide with the final versions of Dunn's and Tang's accounts that we reached above. Thus, I too will reach the top of the same mountain, but by yet another route.

In the case of full beliefs, indicator reliabilism says this: a belief in $X$ by $S$ on the basis of grounds $g$ is justified iff the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has grounds $g$ is high --- that is, close to 1. Tang generalises this to the case of credence, but I think he generalises in the wrong direction; that is, he takes the wrong feature to be salient and uses that to formulate his indicator reliabilism for justified credence. He takes the general form of indicator reliabilism to be something like this: a doxastic attitude $s$ towards $X$ by $S$ on the basis of grounds $g$ is justified iff the attitude $s$ 'matches' the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has grounds $g$. And he takes the categorical attitude of belief in $X$ to 'match' high objective probability of $X$, and credence $x$ in $X$ to 'match' objective probability of $x$ that $X$. The problem with this account is that it leaves mysterious why justification is valuable. Unless we say that matching objective probabilities is somehow epistemic valuable in itself, it isn't clear why we should want to have justified doxastic attitudes in this sense.

I contend instead that the general form of indicator reliabilism is this:

(EIA1) $S$ has $g$;

(EIA2) $s$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EIA3) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then for every doxastic attitude $s'$ of the same sort as $s$, the expected epistemic value of attitude $s'$ towards $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is at most (or not much above) the expected epistemic value of attitude $s$ towards $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$.

Thus, attitude $s$ towards $X$ by $S$ is justified if $s$ is based on a ground $g$ that $S$ has, and $s$ is the attitude towards $X$ that has highest expected accuracy relative to the most inclusive grounds that $S$ has.

Let's consider this in the full belief case. We have:

(EIB1) $S$ has $g$;

(EIB2) $s$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EIB3) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then

To complete this, we need only an account of epistemic value. Here, the veritist's account of epistemic value runs as follows. There are three categorical doxastic attitudes towards a given proposition: belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment. If the proposition is true, belief has greatest epistemic value, then suspension of judgment, then disbelief. If it is false, the order is reversed. It is natural to say that a belief in a truth and disbelief in a falsehood have the same high epistemic value -- following Kenny Easwaran (paper), we denote this $R$ (for `getting it Right'), and assume $R >0$. And it is natural to say that a disbelief in a truth and belief in a falsehood have the same low epistemic value -- again following Easwaran, we denote this $-W$ (for `getting it Wrong'), and assume $W > 0$. And finally it is natural to say that suspension of belief in a truth has the same epistemic value as suspension of belief in a falsehood, and both have epistemic value 0. We assume that $W > R$, just as Easwaran does. Now, suppose proposition $X$ has objective probability $p$. Then the expected epistemic utility of different categorical doxastic attitudes towards $X$ is given below:

(EIB1$^*$) $S$ has $g$;

(EIB2$^*$) the belief in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EIB3$^*$) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ is (nearly) greater than $\frac{W}{R+W}$;

(EIB4$^*$) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (a) $S$ has $g'$ and (b) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is

And of course this is simply a more explicit version of the standard version of indicator reliabilism. It is more explicit because it gives a particular threshold above which the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ counts as 'high', and above which (or not much below which) the belief in $X$ by $S$ counts as justified --- that threshold is $\frac{W}{R+W}$.

Note that this epistemic value version of indicator reliabilism for justified doxastic states also gives a straightforward account of when a suspension of judgment is justified. Simply replace (EIB3$^*$) and (EIB4$^*$) with:

(EIS3$^*$) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ is (nearly) between $\frac{W}{R+W}$ and $\frac{R}{R+W}$;

(EIS4$^*$) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (a) $S$ has $g'$ and (b) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is

And when a disbelief is justified. This time, replace (EIB3$^*$) and (EIB4$^*$) with:

(EID3$^*$) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ is (nearly) less than $\frac{R}{R+W}$;

(EID4$^*$) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (a) $S$ has $g'$ and (b) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is

Next, let's turn to indicator reliabilism for justified credence. Here's the epistemic value version:

(EIC1) $S$ has $g$;

(EIC2) credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EIC3) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then for every credence $x'$, the expected epistemic value of credence $x'$ in $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is at most (or not much above) the expected epistemic value of credence $x$ in $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$.

Again, to complete this, we need an account of epistemic value for credences. As noted above, the veritist holds that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for credences is their accuracy. There is a lot to be said about different potential measures of the accuracy of a credence -- see, for instance, Jim Joyce's 2009 paper 'Accuracy and Coherence', chapters 3 & 4 of my 2016 book

(EIC3$^*$) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g$ approximates or equals $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$;

(EIC4$^*$) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (i) $S$ has $g'$ and (ii) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g'$ does not equal or approximate $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g'$}) \not \approx x$.

But of course EIC3 = TIC3 and EIC4 = TIC4 from above. Thus, the veritist version of indicator reliabilism for justified credences is equivalent to Tang's indicator reliabilism, and thus to the calibrationist version of process reliabilism.

Next, let's turn to process reliabilism. How might we give an epistemic value version of that? The mistake made by the calibrationist version of process reliabilism is of the same sort as the mistake made by Tang in his formulation of indicator reliabilism -- both generalise from the case of full beliefs in the wrong way by mistaking an accidental feature for the salient feature. For the calibrationist, a full belief is justified if it is formed by a reliable process, and a process is reliable if a high proportion of the beliefs it produces are true. Now, notice that there is a sense in which such a process is calibrated: a belief is associated with a high degree of confidence, and that matches, at least approximately, the high truth-ratio of the process. In fact, we want to say that this process is belief-reliable. For it is possible for a process to be reliable in its formation of beliefs, but not in its formation of disbeliefs. So a process is disbelief-reliable if a high proportion of the disbeliefs it produces are false. And we might say that a process is suspension-reliable if a middling proportion the suspensions it forms are true and a middling proportion are false. In each case, we think that, corresponding to each sort of categorical doxastic attitude $s$, there is a fitting proportion $x$ such that a process is $s$-reliable if $x$ is (approximately) the proportion of truths amongst the propositions to which it assigns $s$. Applying this in the credal case gives us the calibrationist version of process reliabilism that we have already met -- a credence $x$ in $S$ is justified if it is formed by a process whose truth-ratio for a given credence is equal to that credence. However, being the product of a belief-reliable process is not the feature of a belief in virtue of which it is justified. Rather, a belief is justified if it is the product of a process that has high expected epistemic value.

(EPA1-$\beta$) $s$ is produced by a process $\rho$;

(EPA2-$\beta$) If $\rho'$ is a process that is available to $S$, then the expected epistemic value of $\rho'$ is at most (or not much more than) the expected epistemic value of $\rho$.

That is, a doxastic attitude is justified for an agent if it is the output of a process that maximizes or nearly maximizes expected epistemic value amongst all processes that are available to her. To complete this account, we must say which processes count as available to an agent. To answer this, recall Comesaña's solution to the Generality Problem. On this solution, the only processes that interest us have the form,

(EPA1-$\alpha$) $s$ is produced by process $\rho^g_{s, X}$;

(EPA2-$\alpha$) If $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then for every doxastic attitude $s'$, the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^{g'}_{s', X}$ is at most (or not much more than) the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^{g}_{s, X}$.

Thus, in the case of full beliefs, we have:

(EPB1) Belief in $X$ is produced by process $\rho^g_{\mathrm{bel}, X}$;

(EPB2) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then

And it is easy to see that (EPB1) = (EIB1) + (EIB2), since belief in $X$ is produced by process $\rho^g_{\mathrm{bel}, X}$ iff $S$ has ground $g$ and a belief in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$. Also, (EPB2) is equivalent to (EIB3). Thus, as for the epistemic version of indicator reliabilism, we get:

(EPB1) $S$ has $g$;

(EPB2) the belief in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EPB3) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ is (nearly) greater than $\frac{W}{R+W}$;

(EPB4) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (a) $S$ has $g'$ and (b) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is

Next, consider how the epistemic value version of process reliabilism applies to credences.

(EPC1) the credence in $x$ is produced by process $\rho^g_{x, X}$;

(EPC2) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ and $x'$ is a credence, then the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^{g'}_{x', X}$ is at most (or not much more than) the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^g_{x, X}$.

As before, we see that (EPC1) is equivalent to (EIC1) + (EIC2). And, providing the measure of accuracy is strictly proper and continuous, we get that (EPC2) is equivalent to (EIC3). So, once again, we arrive at the same summit. The routes taken by Tang, Dunn, and the epistemic value versions of process and indicator reliabilism lead to the same spot, namely, the following account of justified credence:

(ERC1) $S$ has $g$;

(ERC2) credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(ERC3) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g$ approximates or equals $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$;

(ERC4) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (i) $S$ has $g'$ and (ii) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g'$ does not equal or approximate $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g'$}) \not \approx x$.

Reliabilism about justified beliefs comes in two varieties: process reliabilism and indicator reliabilism. Roughly, process reliabilism says that a belief is justified if it is formed by a reliable process, while indicator reliabilism says that a belief is justified if it is based on a ground that renders it likely. Reliabilism about justified credence also comes in two varieties; indeed, it comes in the same two varieties. And, indeed, of the two existing proposals, Jeff Dunn's is a version of process reliabilism (paper) while Weng Hong Tang offers a version of indicator reliabilism (paper). As we will see, both face the same objection. If they are right about what justification is, it is mysterious why we care about justification, for neither of the accounts connects justification to a source of epistemic value. We will call this the

*Connection Problem*.I begin by describing Dunn's process reliabilism and Tang's indicator reliabilism. I argue that, understood correctly, they are, in fact, extensionally equivalent. That is, Dunn and Tang reach the top of the same mountain, albeit by different routes. However, I argue that both face the Connection Problem. In response, I offer my own version of reliabilism, which is both process and indicator, and I argue that it solves that problem. Furthermore, I show that it is also extensionally equivalent to Dunn's reliabilism and Tang's.

## Reliabilism and Dunn on reliable credence

Let us begin with Dunn's process reliabilism for justified credences. Now, to be clear, Dunn takes himself only to be providing an account of reliability for credence-forming processes. He doesn't necessarily endorse the other two conjuncts of reliabilism, which say that a credence is justified if it is reliable, and that a credence is reliable if formed by a reliable process. Instead, Dunn speculates that perhaps being reliably formed is but one of the epistemic virtues, and he wonders whether all of the epistemic virtues are required for justification. Nonetheless, I will consider a version of reliabilism for justified credences that is based on Dunn's account of reliable credence. For reasons that will become clear, I will call this the calibrationist version of process reliabilism for justified credence. Dunn rejects it based on what I will call below the

*Graining Problem*. As we will see, I think we can answer that objection.For Dunn, a credence-forming process is perfectly reliable if it is well calibrated. Here's what it means for a process $\rho$ to be well calibrated:

- First, we construct a set of all and only the outputs of the process $\rho$ in the actual world and in nearby counterfactual scenarios. An output of $\rho$ consists of a credence $x$ in a proposition $X$ at a particular time $t$ in a particular possible world $w$ -- so we represent it by the tuple $(x, X, w, t)$. If $w$ is a nearby world and $t$ a nearby time, we call $(x, X, w, t)$ a
*nearby output*. Let $O_\rho$ be the set of nearby outputs -- that is, the set of tuples $(x, X, w, t)$, where $w$ is a nearby world, $t$ is a nearby time, and $\rho$ assigns credence $x$ to proposition $X$ in world $w$ at time $t$. - Second, we say that the truth-ratio of $\rho$ for credence $x$ is the proportion of nearby outputs $(x, X, w, t)$ in $O_\rho$ such that $X$ is true at $w$ and $t$.
- Finally, we say that $\rho$ is well calibrated (or nearly so) if, for each credence $x$ that $\rho$ assigns, $x$ is equal to (or approximately equal to) the truth-ratio of $\rho$ for $x$.

This, then, is Dunn's calibrationist account of the reliability of a credence-forming process. Any version of reliabilism about justified credences that is based on it requires two further ingredients. First, we must use the account to say when an individual credence is reliable; second, we must add the claim that a credence is justified iff it is reliable. Both of these moves creates problems. We will address them below. But first it will be useful to present Tang's version of indicator reliabilism for justified credence. It will provide an important clue that helps us solve one of the problems that Dunn's account faces. And, having it in hand, it will be easier to see how these two accounts end up coinciding.

## Tang's indicator reliabilism for justified credence

According to indicator reliabilism for justified belief, a belief is justified if the ground on which it is based is a good indicator of the truth of that belief. Thus, beliefs formed on the basis of visual experiences tend to be justified because the fact that the agent had the visual experience in question makes it likely that the belief they based on it is true. Wishful thinking, on the other hand, usually does not give rise to justified belief because the fact that an agent hopes that a particular proposition will be true -- which in this case is the ground of their belief -- does not make it likely that the proposition is true.

Tang seeks to extend this account of justified belief to the case of credence. Here is his first attempt at an account:

**Tang's Indicator Reliabilism for Justified Credence (first pass)**A credence of $x$ in $X$ by an agent $S$ is justified iff(TIC1-$\alpha$) $S$ has ground $g$;

(TIC2-$\alpha$) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $E$;

(TIC3-$\alpha$) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g$ approximates or equals $x$ -- we write this $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$.

Thus, just as an agent's full belief in a proposition is justified if its ground makes the objective probability of that proposition close to 1, a credence $x$ in a proposition is justified if its ground makes the objective probability of that proposition close to $x$. There is a substantial problem here in identifying exactly to which notion of objective probability Tang wishes to appeal. But we will leave that aside for the moment, other than to say that he conceives of it along the lines of hypothetical frequentism -- that is, the objective probability of $X$ given $Y$ is the hypothetical frequency with which propositions like $X$ are true when propositions like $Y$ are true.

However, as Tang notes, as stated, his version of indicator reliabilism faces a problem. Suppose I am presented with an empty urn. I watch as it is filled with 100 balls, numbered 1 to 100, half of which are white, and half of which are black. I shake the urn vigorously and extract a ball. It's number 73 and it's white. I look at its colour and the numeral printed on it. I have a visual experience of a white ball with '73' on it. On the basis of my visual experience of the numeral alone, I assign credence 0.5 to the proposition that ball 73 is white. According to Wang's first version of indicator reliabilism for justified credence, my credence is justified. My ground is the visual experience of the number on the ball; I have that ground; I base my credence on that ground; and the objective probability that ball 73 is white given that I have a visual experience of the numeral '73' printed on it is 50% -- after all, half the balls are white. Of course, the problem is that I have not used my total evidence -- or, in the language of grounds, I have not based my belief on my most inclusive ground. I had the visual experience of the numeral on the ball as a ground; but I also had the visual experience of the numeral on the ball

*and the colour of the ball*as a ground. The resulting credence is unjustified because the objective probability that ball 73 is white given I have the more inclusive ground is not 0.5 -- it is close to 1, since my visual system is so reliable. This leads Tang to amend his account of justified credence as follows:**Tang's Indicator Reliabilism for Justified Credence**A credence of $x$ in $X$ by an agent $S$ is justified iff(TIC1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(TIC2) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(TIC3) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g$ approximates or equals $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$;

(TIC4) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (i) $S$ has $g'$ and (ii) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g'$ does not equal or approximate $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g'$}) \not \approx x$.

This, then, is Tang's version of indicator reliabilism for justified credences.

## Same mountain, different routes

Thus, we have now seen Dunn's process reliabilism and Tang's indicator reliabilism for justified credences. Is either correct? If so, which? In one sense, both are correct; in another, neither is. Less mysteriously: as we will see in this section, Dunn's process reliablism and Tang's indicator reliabilism are extensionally equivalent -- that is, the same credences are justified on both. What's more, as we will see in the final section, both are extensionally equivalent to the correct account of justified credence, which is thus a version of both process and indicator reliabilism. However, while they get the extension right, they do so for the wrong reasons. A justified credence is not justified because it is formed by a well calibrated process; and it is not justified because it matches the objective chance given its grounds. Thus, Dunn and Tang delimit the correct extension, but they use the wrong intension. In the final section of this post, I will offer what I take to be the correct intension. But first, let's see why it is that the routes that Dunn and Tang take lead them both to the top of the same mountain.

We begin with Dunn's calibrationist account of the reliability of a credence-forming process. As we noted above, any version of reliabilism about justified credences that is based on this account requires two further ingredients. First, we must use the calibrationist account of reliable credence-forming processes to say when an individual credence is reliable. The natural answer: when it is formed by a reliable credence-forming process. But then we must be able to identify, for a given credence, the process of which it is an output. The problem is that, for any credence, there are a great many processes of which it might be the output. I have a visual experience of a piece of red cloth on my desk, and I form a high credence that there is a piece of red cloth on my desk. Is this credence the output of a process that assigns a high credence that that there is a piece of red cloth on my desk whenever I have that visual experience? Or is it the output of a process that assigns a high credence that there is a piece of red cloth on my desk whenever I have that visual experience

*and the lighting conditions in my office are good*, while it assigns a middling credence that there is a piece of red cloth on my desk whenever I have that visual experience*and the lighting conditions in my office are bad*? It is easy to see that this is important. The first process is poorly calibrated, and thus unreliable on Dunn's account; the second process is better calibrated and thus more reliable on Dunn's account. This is the so-called*Generality Problem*, and it is a challenge that faces any version of reliabilism. I will offer a version of Juan Comesaña's solution to this problem below -- as we will see, that solution also clears the way for a natural solution to the Graining Problem, which we consider next.Dunn provides an account of when a credence-forming process is reliable. And, once we have a solution to the Generality Problem, we can use that to say when a credence is reliable -- it is reliable when formed by a reliable credence-forming process. Finally, to complete the version of process reliablism about justified credence that we are basing on Dunn's account, we just need the claim that a credence is justified iff it is reliable. But this too faces a problem, which we call the

*Graining Problem*. As we did above, suppose I am presented with an empty urn. I watch as it is filled with 100 balls, numbered 1 to 100, half of which are white, and half of which are black. I shake the urn vigorously and extract a ball. I look at its colour and the numeral printed on it. I have two processes at my disposal. Process 1 takes my visual experience of the numeral only, say '$n$', and assigns the credence 0.5 to the proposition that ball $n$ is white. Process 2 takes my visual experience of the numeral, '$n$',*and my visual experience of the colour of the ball*, and assigns credence 1 to the proposition that ball $n$ is white if my visual experience is of a white ball, and assigns credence 1 to the proposition that ball $n$ is black if my visual experience is of a black ball. Note that both processes are well calibrated (or nearly so, if we allow that my visual system is very slightly fallible). But we would usually judge the credence formed by the second to be better justified than the credence formed by the first. Indeed, we would typically say that a Process 1 credence is unjustified, while a Process 2 credence is justified. Thus, being formed by a well calibrated or nearly well calibrated process is not sufficient for justification. And, if reliability is calibration, then reliability is not justification and reliabilism fails. It is this problem that leads Dunn to reject reliabilism about justified credence. However, as we will see below, I think he is a little hasty.Let us consider the Generality Problem first. To this problem, Juan Comesaña offers the following solution (paper). Every account of doxastic justification -- that is, every account of when a given doxastic attitude of a particular agent is justified for that agent -- must recognize that two agents may have the same doxastic attitude and the same evidence while the doxastic attitude of one is justified and the doxastic attitude of the other is not, because their doxastic attitudes are not based on the same evidence. The first might base her belief on the total evidence, for instance, whilst the second ignores that evidence and bases his belief purely on wishful thinking. Thus, Comesaña claims, every theory of justification needs a notion of the grounds or the basis of a doxastic attitude. But, once we have that, a solution to the Generality Problem is very close. Comesaña spells out the solution for process reliabilism about full beliefs:

**Well-Founded Process Reliablism for Justified Full Beliefs**A belief that $X$ by an agent $S$ is justified iff(WPB1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(WPB2) the belief that $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(WPB3) the process

*producing a belief state $X$ based on ground $g$*is a reliable process.This is easily adapted to the credal case:

**Well-Founded Process Reliablism for Justified Credences**A credence of $x$ in $X$ by an agent $S$ is justified iff(WPC1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(WPC2) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(WPC3) the process

*producing a credence of $x$ in $X$ based on ground $g$*is a reliable process.Let us now try to apply Comesaña's solution to the Generality Problem to help Dunn's calibrationist reliabilism about justified credences. Recall: according to Dunn, a process $\rho$ is reliable if it is well calibrated (or nearly so). Consider the process

*producing a credence of $x$ in $X$ based on ground $g$*-- for convenience, we'll write it $\rho^g_{X,x}$. There is only one credence that it assigns, namely $x$. So it is well calibrated if that truth-ratio of $\rho^g_{X,x}$ for $x$ is equal to $x$. Now, $O_{\rho^g_{X,x}}$ is the set of tuples $(X, x, w, t)$ where $w$ is a nearby world and $t$ a nearby time where $\rho^g_{X,x}$ assigns credence $x$ to proposition $X$. But, by the definition of $\rho^g_{X,x}$, those are the nearby worlds and nearby times at which the agent has the ground $g$. Thus, the truth-ratio of $\rho^g_{X,x}$ for $x$ is the proportion of those nearby worlds and times at which the agent has the ground $g$ at which $X$ is true. And that, it seems to me, is the something like the objective probability of $X$ conditional on the agent having ground $g$, at least given the hypothetical frequentist account of objective probability of the sort that Tang favours. As above, we denote the objective probability of $X$ conditional on the agent $S$ having grounds $g$ as follows: $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$})$. Thus, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$})$ is the truth-ratio of $\rho^g_{p,x}$ for $x$. And thus, a credence $x$ in $X$ based on ground $g$ is reliable iff $x$ is close to $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$})$. That is,**Well-Founded Calibrationist Process Reliabilism for Justified Credences (first attempt)**A credence of $x$ in $X$ by an agent $S$ is justified iff(WCPC1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(WCPC2) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(WCPC3) the process

*producing a credence of $x$ in $X$ based on ground $g$*is a (nearly) well calibrated process -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$.But now compare Well-Founded Calibrationist Process Reliabilism, based on Dunn's account of reliable processes and Comesaña's solution to the Generality Problem, with Tang's first attempt at Indicator Reliabilism. Consider the necessary and sufficient conditions that each imposes for justification: TIC1 = WCPC1; TIC2 = WCPC2; TIC3 = WCPC3. Thus, these are the same account. However, as we saw above, Tang's first attempt to formulate indicator reliabilism for justified credence fails because it counts as justified a credence that is not based on an agent's total evidence; and we also saw that, once the Generality Problem is solved for Dunn's calibrationist process reliabilism, it faces a similar problem, namely, the Graining Problem from above. Tang amends his version of indicator reliabilism by adding the fourth condition TIC4 from above. Might we amend Dunn's calibrationist process reliabilism is a similar way?

**Well-Founded Calibrationist Process Reliabilism for Justified Credences**A credence of $x$ in $X$ by an agent $S$ is justified iff(WCPC1) $S$ has ground $g$;

(WCPC2) the credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on ground $g$;

(WCPC3) the process

*producing a credence of $x$ in $X$ based on ground $g$*is a (nearly) well calibrated process -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$;(WCPC4) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ and credence $x' \not \approx x$, such that the process

*producing a credence of $x'$ in $X$ based on ground $g'$*is a (nearly) well calibrated process -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g'$}) \approx x'$.Since TIC4 is equivalent to WCPC4, this final version of process reliabilism for justified credences is equivalent to Tang's final version of his indicator reliabilism for justified credences. Thus, Dunn and Tang have reached the top of the same mountain, albeit by different routes

## The third route up the mountain

Once we have addressed certain problems with the calibrationist version of process reliabilism for justified credence, we see that it agrees with the current best version of indicator reliabilism. This gives us a little hope that both have hit upon the correct account of justification. In the end, I will conclude that both have indeed hit upon the correct

*extension*of the concept of justified credence. But that have done so for the wrong reasons, for they have not hit upon the correct*intension*.There are two sorts of route you might take when pursuing an account of justification for a given sort of doxastic attitude, such as a credence or a full belief. You might look to intuitions concerning particular cases and try to discern a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that sort these cases in the same way that your intuitions do; or, you might begin with an account of epistemic value, assume that justification must be linked in some natural way to the promotion of epistemic value, and then provide an account of justification that vindicates that assumption. Dunn and Tang have each taken a route of the first sort; I will follow a route of the second sort.

I will adopt the veritist's account of epistemic value. That is, I take accuracy to be the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for a credence, where a credence in a true proposition is more accurate the higher it is; a credence in a false proposition is more accurate the lower it is. Given this account of epistemic value, what is the natural account of justification? Well, at first sight, there are two: one is process reliabilist; the other is indicator reliabilist. But, in a twist that should come as little surprise given the conclusions of the previous section, it will turn out that these two accounts coincide, and indeed coincide with the final versions of Dunn's and Tang's accounts that we reached above. Thus, I too will reach the top of the same mountain, but by yet another route.

### Epistemic value version of indicator reliabilism

In the case of full beliefs, indicator reliabilism says this: a belief in $X$ by $S$ on the basis of grounds $g$ is justified iff the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has grounds $g$ is high --- that is, close to 1. Tang generalises this to the case of credence, but I think he generalises in the wrong direction; that is, he takes the wrong feature to be salient and uses that to formulate his indicator reliabilism for justified credence. He takes the general form of indicator reliabilism to be something like this: a doxastic attitude $s$ towards $X$ by $S$ on the basis of grounds $g$ is justified iff the attitude $s$ 'matches' the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has grounds $g$. And he takes the categorical attitude of belief in $X$ to 'match' high objective probability of $X$, and credence $x$ in $X$ to 'match' objective probability of $x$ that $X$. The problem with this account is that it leaves mysterious why justification is valuable. Unless we say that matching objective probabilities is somehow epistemic valuable in itself, it isn't clear why we should want to have justified doxastic attitudes in this sense.

I contend instead that the general form of indicator reliabilism is this:

**Indicator reliabilism for justified doxastic attitude (epistemic value version)**Doxastic attitude $s$ towards proposition $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(EIA1) $S$ has $g$;

(EIA2) $s$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EIA3) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then for every doxastic attitude $s'$ of the same sort as $s$, the expected epistemic value of attitude $s'$ towards $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is at most (or not much above) the expected epistemic value of attitude $s$ towards $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$.

Thus, attitude $s$ towards $X$ by $S$ is justified if $s$ is based on a ground $g$ that $S$ has, and $s$ is the attitude towards $X$ that has highest expected accuracy relative to the most inclusive grounds that $S$ has.

Let's consider this in the full belief case. We have:

**Indicator reliabilism for justified belief (epistemic value version)**A belief in proposition $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(EIB1) $S$ has $g$;

(EIB2) $s$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EIB3) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then

- the expected epistemic value of
*disbelief*in $X$, given that $S$ has $g'$, is at most (or not much above) the expected epistemic value of*belief*in $X$, given that $S$ has $g'$; - the expected epistemic value of
*suspension*in $X$, given that $S$ has $g'$, is at most (or not much above) the expected epistemic value of*belief*in $X$, given that $S$ has $g'$.

To complete this, we need only an account of epistemic value. Here, the veritist's account of epistemic value runs as follows. There are three categorical doxastic attitudes towards a given proposition: belief, disbelief, and suspension of judgment. If the proposition is true, belief has greatest epistemic value, then suspension of judgment, then disbelief. If it is false, the order is reversed. It is natural to say that a belief in a truth and disbelief in a falsehood have the same high epistemic value -- following Kenny Easwaran (paper), we denote this $R$ (for `getting it Right'), and assume $R >0$. And it is natural to say that a disbelief in a truth and belief in a falsehood have the same low epistemic value -- again following Easwaran, we denote this $-W$ (for `getting it Wrong'), and assume $W > 0$. And finally it is natural to say that suspension of belief in a truth has the same epistemic value as suspension of belief in a falsehood, and both have epistemic value 0. We assume that $W > R$, just as Easwaran does. Now, suppose proposition $X$ has objective probability $p$. Then the expected epistemic utility of different categorical doxastic attitudes towards $X$ is given below:

- Expected epistemic value of belief in $X$ = $p\cdot R + (1-p)\cdot(-W)$.
- Expected epistemic value of suspension in $X$ = $p\cdot 0 + (1-p)\cdot 0$.
- Expected epistemic value of disbelief in $X$ = $p\cdot (-W) + (1-p)\cdot R$.

**Indicator reliabilism for justified belief (veritist version)**A belief in $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(EIB1$^*$) $S$ has $g$;

(EIB2$^*$) the belief in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EIB3$^*$) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ is (nearly) greater than $\frac{W}{R+W}$;

(EIB4$^*$) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (a) $S$ has $g'$ and (b) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is

*not*(nearly) greater than $\frac{W}{R+W}$.And of course this is simply a more explicit version of the standard version of indicator reliabilism. It is more explicit because it gives a particular threshold above which the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ counts as 'high', and above which (or not much below which) the belief in $X$ by $S$ counts as justified --- that threshold is $\frac{W}{R+W}$.

Note that this epistemic value version of indicator reliabilism for justified doxastic states also gives a straightforward account of when a suspension of judgment is justified. Simply replace (EIB3$^*$) and (EIB4$^*$) with:

(EIS3$^*$) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ is (nearly) between $\frac{W}{R+W}$ and $\frac{R}{R+W}$;

(EIS4$^*$) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (a) $S$ has $g'$ and (b) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is

*not*(nearly) between $\frac{W}{R+W}$ and $\frac{R}{R+W}$.And when a disbelief is justified. This time, replace (EIB3$^*$) and (EIB4$^*$) with:

(EID3$^*$) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ is (nearly) less than $\frac{R}{R+W}$;

(EID4$^*$) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (a) $S$ has $g'$ and (b) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is

*not*(nearly) less than $\frac{R}{R+W}$.Next, let's turn to indicator reliabilism for justified credence. Here's the epistemic value version:

**Indicator reliabilism for justified credence (epistemic value version)**A credence of $x$ in proposition $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(EIC1) $S$ has $g$;

(EIC2) credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EIC3) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then for every credence $x'$, the expected epistemic value of credence $x'$ in $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is at most (or not much above) the expected epistemic value of credence $x$ in $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$.

Again, to complete this, we need an account of epistemic value for credences. As noted above, the veritist holds that the sole fundamental source of epistemic value for credences is their accuracy. There is a lot to be said about different potential measures of the accuracy of a credence -- see, for instance, Jim Joyce's 2009 paper 'Accuracy and Coherence', chapters 3 & 4 of my 2016 book

*Accuracy and the Laws of Credence*, or Ben Levinstein's forthcoming paper 'A Pragmatist's Guide to Epistemic Utility'. But here I will say only this: we assume that those measures are*continuous*and*strictly proper*. That is, we assume: (i) we assume that the accuracy of a credence is a continuous function of that credence; and (ii) any probability $x$ in a proposition $X$ expects credence $x$ to be more accurate than it expects any other credence $x' \neq x$ in $X$ to be. These two assumptions are widespread in the literature on accuracy-first epistemology, and they are required for many of the central arguments in that area. Given veritism and the continuity and strict propriety of the accuracy measures, (EIC3) is provably equivalent to the conjunction of:(EIC3$^*$) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g$ approximates or equals $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$;

(EIC4$^*$) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (i) $S$ has $g'$ and (ii) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g'$ does not equal or approximate $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g'$}) \not \approx x$.

But of course EIC3 = TIC3 and EIC4 = TIC4 from above. Thus, the veritist version of indicator reliabilism for justified credences is equivalent to Tang's indicator reliabilism, and thus to the calibrationist version of process reliabilism.

## Epistemic value version of process reliabilism

Next, let's turn to process reliabilism. How might we give an epistemic value version of that? The mistake made by the calibrationist version of process reliabilism is of the same sort as the mistake made by Tang in his formulation of indicator reliabilism -- both generalise from the case of full beliefs in the wrong way by mistaking an accidental feature for the salient feature. For the calibrationist, a full belief is justified if it is formed by a reliable process, and a process is reliable if a high proportion of the beliefs it produces are true. Now, notice that there is a sense in which such a process is calibrated: a belief is associated with a high degree of confidence, and that matches, at least approximately, the high truth-ratio of the process. In fact, we want to say that this process is belief-reliable. For it is possible for a process to be reliable in its formation of beliefs, but not in its formation of disbeliefs. So a process is disbelief-reliable if a high proportion of the disbeliefs it produces are false. And we might say that a process is suspension-reliable if a middling proportion the suspensions it forms are true and a middling proportion are false. In each case, we think that, corresponding to each sort of categorical doxastic attitude $s$, there is a fitting proportion $x$ such that a process is $s$-reliable if $x$ is (approximately) the proportion of truths amongst the propositions to which it assigns $s$. Applying this in the credal case gives us the calibrationist version of process reliabilism that we have already met -- a credence $x$ in $S$ is justified if it is formed by a process whose truth-ratio for a given credence is equal to that credence. However, being the product of a belief-reliable process is not the feature of a belief in virtue of which it is justified. Rather, a belief is justified if it is the product of a process that has high expected epistemic value.

**Process reliabilism for justified doxastic attitude (epistemic value version)**Doxastic attitude $s$ towards proposition $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(EPA1-$\beta$) $s$ is produced by a process $\rho$;

(EPA2-$\beta$) If $\rho'$ is a process that is available to $S$, then the expected epistemic value of $\rho'$ is at most (or not much more than) the expected epistemic value of $\rho$.

That is, a doxastic attitude is justified for an agent if it is the output of a process that maximizes or nearly maximizes expected epistemic value amongst all processes that are available to her. To complete this account, we must say which processes count as available to an agent. To answer this, recall Comesaña's solution to the Generality Problem. On this solution, the only processes that interest us have the form,

*process producing doxastic attitude $s$ towards $X$ on basis of ground $g$*. Clearly, a process of this form is available to an agent exactly when the agent has ground $g$. This gives**Process Reliabilism about Justified Doxastic Attitudes (Epistemic value version)**Attitude $s$ towards proposition $X$ by $S$ is justified iff(EPA1-$\alpha$) $s$ is produced by process $\rho^g_{s, X}$;

(EPA2-$\alpha$) If $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then for every doxastic attitude $s'$, the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^{g'}_{s', X}$ is at most (or not much more than) the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^{g}_{s, X}$.

Thus, in the case of full beliefs, we have:

**Process reliabilism for justified belief (epistemic value version)**A belief in proposition $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(EPB1) Belief in $X$ is produced by process $\rho^g_{\mathrm{bel}, X}$;

(EPB2) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ has, then

- the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^g_{\mathrm{dis}, X}$ is at most (or not much more than) the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^g_{\mathrm{bel}, X}$;
- the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^g_{\mathrm{sus}, X}$ is at most (or not much more than) the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^g_{\mathrm{bel}, X}$;

And it is easy to see that (EPB1) = (EIB1) + (EIB2), since belief in $X$ is produced by process $\rho^g_{\mathrm{bel}, X}$ iff $S$ has ground $g$ and a belief in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$. Also, (EPB2) is equivalent to (EIB3). Thus, as for the epistemic version of indicator reliabilism, we get:

**Indicator reliabilism for justified belief (veritist version)**A belief in $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(EPB1) $S$ has $g$;

(EPB2) the belief in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(EPB3) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g$ is (nearly) greater than $\frac{W}{R+W}$;

(EPB4) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (a) $S$ has $g'$ and (b) the objective probability of $X$ given that $S$ has $g'$ is

*not*(nearly) greater than $\frac{W}{R+W}$.Next, consider how the epistemic value version of process reliabilism applies to credences.

**Process reliabilism for justified credence (epistemic value version)**A credence of $x$ in proposition $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(EPC1) the credence in $x$ is produced by process $\rho^g_{x, X}$;

(EPC2) if $g' \subseteq g$ is a ground that $S$ and $x'$ is a credence, then the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^{g'}_{x', X}$ is at most (or not much more than) the expected epistemic value of process $\rho^g_{x, X}$.

As before, we see that (EPC1) is equivalent to (EIC1) + (EIC2). And, providing the measure of accuracy is strictly proper and continuous, we get that (EPC2) is equivalent to (EIC3). So, once again, we arrive at the same summit. The routes taken by Tang, Dunn, and the epistemic value versions of process and indicator reliabilism lead to the same spot, namely, the following account of justified credence:

**Reliabilism for justified credence (epistemic value version)**A credence of $x$ in proposition $X$ by agent $S$ is justified iff(ERC1) $S$ has $g$;

(ERC2) credence $x$ in $X$ by $S$ is based on $g$;

(ERC3) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g$ approximates or equals $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g$}) \approx x$;

(ERC4) there is no more inclusive ground $g'$ such that (i) $S$ has $g'$ and (ii) the objective probability of $X$ given that the agent has ground $g'$ does not equal or approximate $x$ -- that is, $P(X | \mbox{$S$ has $g'$}) \not \approx x$.

## Tuesday, 31 January 2017

### Fifth Reasoning Club Conference @ Turin EXTENDED DEADLINE

The Fifth Reasoning Club Conference will take place at the Center for Logic, Language, and Cognition in Turin on May 18-19, 2017.

Keynote speakers:

Branden FITELSON (Northeastern University, Boston)

Jeanne PEIJNENBURG (University of Groningen)

Katya TENTORI (University of Trento)

Paul EGRÉ (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris)

Organizing committee: Gustavo Cevolani (Turin), Vincenzo Crupi (Turin), Jason Konek (Kent), and Paolo Maffezioli (Turin).

CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

The submission deadline for the Fifth Reasoning Club Conference has been EXTENDED to 15 February 2017. The final decision on submissions will be made by 15 March 2017.

All PhD candidates and early career researchers with interests in reasoning and inference, broadly construed, are encouraged to submit an abstract of up to 500 words (prepared for blind review) via Easy Chair at https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=rcc17. We especially welcome members of groups that are underrepresented in philosophy to submit. We are committed to promoting diversity in our final programme.

Grants will be available to help cover travel costs for contributed speakers. To apply for a travel grant, please send a CV and a short travel budget estimate in a single pdf file to reasoningclubconference2017@gmail.com.

More information is available at http://www.llc.unito.it/notizie/reasoning-club-2017-llc-call-papers-now-open. For any queries please contact Vincenzo Crupi (vincenzo.crupi@unito.it) or Jason Konek (J.Konek@kent.ac.uk).

The Reasoning Club is a network of institutes, centres, departments, and groups addressing research topics connected to reasoning, inference, and methodology broadly construed. It issues the monthly gazette The Reasoner.

## Saturday, 21 January 2017

### More on the Principal Principle and the Principle of Indifference

Last week, I posted about a recent paper by James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann, and Jon Williamson called 'The Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference', which was published in the

Read like this, my response to the argument ran thus:

However, there is another reading of the HLWW argument, and indeed it seems that some of H, L, W, and W favour it. On this alternative reading, it is not assumed that Conditions 1 and 2 follow from any adequate account of admissibility. Rather Conditions 1 and 2 are not taken to be consequences of the Principal Principle at all. Rather, they are intended to be plausible further constraints on credences that are independent of the Principal Principle. Thus, on this reading, the conclusion of the HLWW is not that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference. Rather, it is that the Principal Principle, together with two further norms (namely, Conditions 1 and 2), implies the Principle of Indifference.

In this post, I will raise an objection to this alternative argument.

The HLWW argument turns on a mathematical theorem. It takes certain constraints -- (I), (II), (III) below -- and shows that, if an agent's credence function satisfies those constraints, then it must satisfy a particular instance of the Principle of Indifference.

(I) $P(F | X) = P(F)$

(II) $P(A | FX) = x$

(III) $P(A | X (A \leftrightarrow F)) = x$

then

(IV) $P(F) = 0.5$.

Now, the instance of the Principle of Indifference that HLWW wish to infer using this theorem is this:

Thus, to obtain this from Theorem 1, we need the following: for each atomic $F$, there is $A$, $X$, and $0 < x < 1$ that satisfy (I), (II), and (III). Conditions 1 and 2 are intended to obtain this, but I think the argument is clearest if we argue for them directly, using the considerations found in HLWW.

Thus, suppose $F$ is atomic. Then the idea is this. Pick a proposition $X$ with two features: (a) if you were to learn $X$ and nothing more as your first piece of evidence, it would place a very strict constraint on your credence in $A$ --- it would require you to have credence $x$ in $A$; (b) $X$ provides no information about $F$ nor about the relationship between $A$ and $F$. Now, providing that $A$ is not logically related to $F$, we might take $X$ to be the proposition $C^A_x$ that says that the objective chance of $A$ is $x$. By the Principal Principle, $C^A_x$ has the first feature (a): $P_0(A | X) = x$. What's more, since $A$ is logically independent of $F$, $C^A_x$ also has the second feature (b): in the absence of further evidence, and in particular evidence about the relationship between $A$ and $F$, $C^A_x$ provides no information about $F$ nor about the relationship between $A$ and $F$.

Now, with $A$, $X$, $x$ in hand, we appeal to two principles concerning the way that we should respond to evidence:

(Ev1): If your credence function is $P$ and your evidence does not provide any information about the connection between $B$ and $C$, then $P(B | C) = P(B)$.

In slogan form, this says:

(Ev2): If you have strong evidence concerning $B$ and no evidence concerning $C$, then $P(B | B \leftrightarrow C) = P(B)$.

In slogan form, as we will see:

Now, from (Ev1), we immediately obtain (I) for our agent's initial credence function $P_0$ with $F$ atomic and $X = C^A_x$. After all, if you have no evidence, your evidence certainly does not provide any information about the connection between $C^A_x$ and $F$.

From (Ev1) and the Principal Principle, we obtain (II) for $P_0$ with $F$ atomic and $X = C^A_x$. Suppose you first learn $C^A_x$ as evidence. So your credence function is $P_1(-) = P_0(-|C^A_x)$. Now, by hypothesis, $C^A_x$ provides no information about the connection between $F$ and $A$. Then, by (Ev1), $P_1(A | F) = P_1(A)$. So $P_0(A | F\ \&\ C^A_x) = P_0(A | C^A_x)$. And, by the Principal Principle, $P_0(A | C^A_x) = x$. So $P_0(A | F\ \&\ C^A_x) = x$.

Finally, from (Ev2) and the Principal Principle, we (III) for $P_0$ with $F$ atomic and $X = C^A_x$. Again, suppose you learn $C^A_x$. So $P_1(-) = P_0(-|C^A_x)$. You thus have strong evidence concerning $A$ and no evidence concerning $F$. Thus, by (Ev2), $P_1(A | A \leftrightarrow F) = P_1(A)$. That is, $P_0(A | C^A_x\ \&\ (A \leftrightarrow F)) = P_0(A | C^A_x)$. And by the Principal Principle, $P_0(A | C^A_x) = x$. So $P_0(A | C^A_x\ \&\ (A \leftrightarrow F)) = x$.

Thus, the plausibility of the HLWW argument turns on the plausibility of (Ev1) and (Ev2). Unfortunately, both beg the question concerning the Principle of Indifference. As a result, they cannot be assumed in a justification of that norm. Let's consider each in turn.

First, (Ev1). If your evidence does not provide any information about the connection between $B$ and $C$, then this evidence leaves open the possibility that $B$ is positively relevant to $C$; it leaves open the possibility that $B$ is negatively relevant to $C$; and it leaves open the possibility that $B$ is irrelevant to $C$. But (Ev1) demands that we deny the first two possibilities and take $B$ to be irrelevant to $C$. But why? Without further argument, it seems that we would be equally justified in taking $B$ to be positively relevant to $C$ and equally justified in taking $C$ to be negatively relevant to $C$.

Second, (Ev2). The idea is this: When I learn that two propositions, $B$ and $C$, are equivalent, there are many ways I might respond. I might retain my prior credence in $B$ and bring my credence in $C$ into line with that. Or I might retain my prior credence in $C$ and bring my credence in $B$ into line with that. Or I might do many other things. (Ev2) says that, if I have strong evidence concerning $B$ and no evidence concerning $C$, then I should opt for the first response and retain my prior credence in $B$ -- which was formed in response to the strong evidence concerning $B$ -- and bring my credence in $C$ into line with that -- since my prior credence in $C$ was, in any case, formed in response to no relevant evidence at all.

Now, on the face of it, this seems like a reasonable constraint on our response to evidence. It says, essentially, that credence formed in response to stronger evidence should be more resilient than credence formed in response to weaker evidence. And, as a limiting case, credence formed in response to strong evidence, such as evidence about the chances, should be maximally resilient when compared to credence formed in response to no evidence. (Note that a similar way of thinking might give an alternative motivation for (II), since this is also a principle of resilient credence.)

However, unfortunately, (Ev2) threatens to be inconsistent. After all, it is easy to suppose that there are propositions $B$, $C$, and $D$ such that you have strong evidence for $B$, but no evidence concerning $C$ or $D$ or $C\ \&\ D$ or $C\ \&\ \neg D$. But, in that situation, (Ev2) entails:

And unfortunately these are inconsistent constraints on a probability function. To avoid this inconsistency, the defender of (Ev2) must say that, in fact, our lack of evidence concerning $C$, $D$, $C\ \&\ D$ and $C\ \&\ \neg D$ indeed counts as no evidence concerning $C$ and $D$, but does count as evidence concerning $C\ \&\ D$ and $C\ \&\ \neg D$. How might they do that? Well, they might note that, while $C$ and $D$ are each true in half the possible worlds, since they are atomic, $C\ \&\ D$ and $C\ \&\ \neg D$ are true only in a quarter of the possible worlds. And thus a lack of evidence is in fact evidence against them. But of course this line of argument appeals to the Principle of Indifference. Only if you think that every world should receive equal credence will you think that a lack of evidence counts as no evidence for a proposition that is true at half of the possible worlds, but counts as genuine evidence against a proposition that is true at only a quarter of the worlds.

Thus, I conclude that the HLWW argument fails. While (Ev1) and (Ev2) may be true, we cannot appeal to them in order to justify the Principle of Indifference, since they can only be defended by appealing to the Principle of Indifference itself.

*British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*in 2015. In that post, I read the HLWW paper a particular way. I took their argument to run roughly as follows:*The Principal Principle, as Lewis stated it, includes an admissibility condition. Any adequate account of admissibility should entail Conditions 1 and 2 (see below). Together with Conditions 1 and 2, the Principal Principle entails the Principle of Indifference. Thus, the Principal Principle entails the Principle of Indifference.*Read like this, my response to the argument ran thus:

*There is an account of admissibility -- namely, Levi-admissibility -- that is adequate and on which Condition 2 is not generally true. Levi-admissibility is adequate since has all of the features that Lewis required of admissibility, and it is very natural when we consider a close relative of Lewis' Principal Principle, namely, Levi's Principal Principle, which follows from Lewis' Principal Principle given some natural assumptions about admissibility that Lewis accepts.*However, there is another reading of the HLWW argument, and indeed it seems that some of H, L, W, and W favour it. On this alternative reading, it is not assumed that Conditions 1 and 2 follow from any adequate account of admissibility. Rather Conditions 1 and 2 are not taken to be consequences of the Principal Principle at all. Rather, they are intended to be plausible further constraints on credences that are independent of the Principal Principle. Thus, on this reading, the conclusion of the HLWW is not that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference. Rather, it is that the Principal Principle, together with two further norms (namely, Conditions 1 and 2), implies the Principle of Indifference.

In this post, I will raise an objection to this alternative argument.

The HLWW argument turns on a mathematical theorem. It takes certain constraints -- (I), (II), (III) below -- and shows that, if an agent's credence function satisfies those constraints, then it must satisfy a particular instance of the Principle of Indifference.

**Theorem 1**If there is $0 < x < 1$ such that(I) $P(F | X) = P(F)$

(II) $P(A | FX) = x$

(III) $P(A | X (A \leftrightarrow F)) = x$

then

(IV) $P(F) = 0.5$.

Now, the instance of the Principle of Indifference that HLWW wish to infer using this theorem is this:

**Principle of Indifference (atomic case)**Suppose $F$ is an atomic proposition and $P_0$ is our agent's initial credence function. Then $P_0(F) = 0.5$.Thus, to obtain this from Theorem 1, we need the following: for each atomic $F$, there is $A$, $X$, and $0 < x < 1$ that satisfy (I), (II), and (III). Conditions 1 and 2 are intended to obtain this, but I think the argument is clearest if we argue for them directly, using the considerations found in HLWW.

Thus, suppose $F$ is atomic. Then the idea is this. Pick a proposition $X$ with two features: (a) if you were to learn $X$ and nothing more as your first piece of evidence, it would place a very strict constraint on your credence in $A$ --- it would require you to have credence $x$ in $A$; (b) $X$ provides no information about $F$ nor about the relationship between $A$ and $F$. Now, providing that $A$ is not logically related to $F$, we might take $X$ to be the proposition $C^A_x$ that says that the objective chance of $A$ is $x$. By the Principal Principle, $C^A_x$ has the first feature (a): $P_0(A | X) = x$. What's more, since $A$ is logically independent of $F$, $C^A_x$ also has the second feature (b): in the absence of further evidence, and in particular evidence about the relationship between $A$ and $F$, $C^A_x$ provides no information about $F$ nor about the relationship between $A$ and $F$.

Now, with $A$, $X$, $x$ in hand, we appeal to two principles concerning the way that we should respond to evidence:

(Ev1): If your credence function is $P$ and your evidence does not provide any information about the connection between $B$ and $C$, then $P(B | C) = P(B)$.

In slogan form, this says:

*Ignorance entails irrelevance*.(Ev2): If you have strong evidence concerning $B$ and no evidence concerning $C$, then $P(B | B \leftrightarrow C) = P(B)$.

In slogan form, as we will see:

*Credences supported by stronger evidence are more resilient*.Now, from (Ev1), we immediately obtain (I) for our agent's initial credence function $P_0$ with $F$ atomic and $X = C^A_x$. After all, if you have no evidence, your evidence certainly does not provide any information about the connection between $C^A_x$ and $F$.

From (Ev1) and the Principal Principle, we obtain (II) for $P_0$ with $F$ atomic and $X = C^A_x$. Suppose you first learn $C^A_x$ as evidence. So your credence function is $P_1(-) = P_0(-|C^A_x)$. Now, by hypothesis, $C^A_x$ provides no information about the connection between $F$ and $A$. Then, by (Ev1), $P_1(A | F) = P_1(A)$. So $P_0(A | F\ \&\ C^A_x) = P_0(A | C^A_x)$. And, by the Principal Principle, $P_0(A | C^A_x) = x$. So $P_0(A | F\ \&\ C^A_x) = x$.

Finally, from (Ev2) and the Principal Principle, we (III) for $P_0$ with $F$ atomic and $X = C^A_x$. Again, suppose you learn $C^A_x$. So $P_1(-) = P_0(-|C^A_x)$. You thus have strong evidence concerning $A$ and no evidence concerning $F$. Thus, by (Ev2), $P_1(A | A \leftrightarrow F) = P_1(A)$. That is, $P_0(A | C^A_x\ \&\ (A \leftrightarrow F)) = P_0(A | C^A_x)$. And by the Principal Principle, $P_0(A | C^A_x) = x$. So $P_0(A | C^A_x\ \&\ (A \leftrightarrow F)) = x$.

Thus, the plausibility of the HLWW argument turns on the plausibility of (Ev1) and (Ev2). Unfortunately, both beg the question concerning the Principle of Indifference. As a result, they cannot be assumed in a justification of that norm. Let's consider each in turn.

First, (Ev1). If your evidence does not provide any information about the connection between $B$ and $C$, then this evidence leaves open the possibility that $B$ is positively relevant to $C$; it leaves open the possibility that $B$ is negatively relevant to $C$; and it leaves open the possibility that $B$ is irrelevant to $C$. But (Ev1) demands that we deny the first two possibilities and take $B$ to be irrelevant to $C$. But why? Without further argument, it seems that we would be equally justified in taking $B$ to be positively relevant to $C$ and equally justified in taking $C$ to be negatively relevant to $C$.

Second, (Ev2). The idea is this: When I learn that two propositions, $B$ and $C$, are equivalent, there are many ways I might respond. I might retain my prior credence in $B$ and bring my credence in $C$ into line with that. Or I might retain my prior credence in $C$ and bring my credence in $B$ into line with that. Or I might do many other things. (Ev2) says that, if I have strong evidence concerning $B$ and no evidence concerning $C$, then I should opt for the first response and retain my prior credence in $B$ -- which was formed in response to the strong evidence concerning $B$ -- and bring my credence in $C$ into line with that -- since my prior credence in $C$ was, in any case, formed in response to no relevant evidence at all.

Now, on the face of it, this seems like a reasonable constraint on our response to evidence. It says, essentially, that credence formed in response to stronger evidence should be more resilient than credence formed in response to weaker evidence. And, as a limiting case, credence formed in response to strong evidence, such as evidence about the chances, should be maximally resilient when compared to credence formed in response to no evidence. (Note that a similar way of thinking might give an alternative motivation for (II), since this is also a principle of resilient credence.)

However, unfortunately, (Ev2) threatens to be inconsistent. After all, it is easy to suppose that there are propositions $B$, $C$, and $D$ such that you have strong evidence for $B$, but no evidence concerning $C$ or $D$ or $C\ \&\ D$ or $C\ \&\ \neg D$. But, in that situation, (Ev2) entails:

- $P(B | B \leftrightarrow C) = P(B)$
- $P(B | B \leftrightarrow (C\ \&\ D)) = P(B)$
- $P(B | B \leftrightarrow (C\ \&\ \neg D)) = P(B)$

And unfortunately these are inconsistent constraints on a probability function. To avoid this inconsistency, the defender of (Ev2) must say that, in fact, our lack of evidence concerning $C$, $D$, $C\ \&\ D$ and $C\ \&\ \neg D$ indeed counts as no evidence concerning $C$ and $D$, but does count as evidence concerning $C\ \&\ D$ and $C\ \&\ \neg D$. How might they do that? Well, they might note that, while $C$ and $D$ are each true in half the possible worlds, since they are atomic, $C\ \&\ D$ and $C\ \&\ \neg D$ are true only in a quarter of the possible worlds. And thus a lack of evidence is in fact evidence against them. But of course this line of argument appeals to the Principle of Indifference. Only if you think that every world should receive equal credence will you think that a lack of evidence counts as no evidence for a proposition that is true at half of the possible worlds, but counts as genuine evidence against a proposition that is true at only a quarter of the worlds.

Thus, I conclude that the HLWW argument fails. While (Ev1) and (Ev2) may be true, we cannot appeal to them in order to justify the Principle of Indifference, since they can only be defended by appealing to the Principle of Indifference itself.

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